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INTRODUCTION 
Nature and Scope of the Problem 
Statement. of the Problem._-:- Attendant with the rapid 
growth of radio broadcasting in the last thirty years and 
with television broadcasting more recently,,have been the 
growth of the broadcasting and telecasting industry's prob-
lems. One of the most interesting of these problems is that 
of the "publication" of defamatory matter over these media. 
Cases of defamation via radio and television are relative-
ly few. However, when they do arise, und.er the strict lia-
bility theory of common law the broadcaster may find him-
self in an embarrassing and unwarranted position. 
OVer a period of years there has been developing a trend 
1n state legislation - legislation which is designed to 
solve some of the many defamation-by-radio-and-television 
problems~ Several states have enacted statutes which gen-
erally relieve broadcasters from liability for defamatory 
remarks published over their faciliti.es by persons other 
than employees, or those immediately connected with the 
station, when the licensee could not,, by the reasonable use 
of "due care", have prevented the dissemination of the de-
famatory matter. Such legislation supplants the common law 
... =-+*=. =· ~strict liabili.ty theory. 
i 
~:: 
Scope - The intention is to approach this study from 
the point of view of the broadcast licensee 1n the hope that 
it may help to clarify the problem for him and answer some 
of the many questions with which he finds himself concerned, 
as well as call to his attenti.on some situations with which 
he may not be familiar as regards defamation by broadcasting 
and telecasting. To be covered are Secti.on 315 of the 
Communica.tions.Act o:f 1934 and its accompanying problems; 
a review o:f specific defamation situations under the H.a.ssa-
chusetts common law strict liability theory as they a:f:fect 
local stations and their network a.f:filiates; an investiga-
tion into and discussion of the existing radio-television 
defamation statutes and, fina.lly., a review o:f the proposal 
o:f the national representative of the radio and television 
industry. 
Purpose of Study .. - The purpose o:f this study is to make 
an examination into the field o:f so-called "due care" legis-
lation relating to action for damages against the owners, 
licensees or operators o:f radio broadcasting and telecasting 
stations for de:fama.tory matter uttered over said stations, 
and to determine w·hether or not there is a need, under 
present JY'JB.ssachusetts conditions, to adopt a. radio-tele-
vision libel protective law in this Commonwealth. 
Justification - Usually such legislation o:f the type 
a:forementioned is achieved through the efforts of state 
associati.ons o.f radio broadcasters and telecasters. Since 
ii 
l~ssachusetts has no such association,l and no such radio-
television libel protective law, and since there has been 
no past discussion of this problem as it applies specifically 
in ~~ssachusetts, it appears that a thorough investigation 
into this field might be a project which would be of sub-
stantial use and value to visual and sound radio broad-
casters in this Commonwealth~ 
Method of Approach - The material for this study was 
compiled mainly from extensive reading of relative cases, 
articles and reference material, supplemented by answers to 
a letter sent to fifty-two Massachusetts broadcasting and 
: telecasting stations~ The purpose of said letter was to 
obtain an expression of the views and feelings of the 
station operators as to whether or not they favored "due 
care" legislation. 
-- : ---:ot'..-
1. Similarly without state associations are: Rhode Island,, 
Connecticut, Maine, New Hallpllb1re, Vermont and New York~ 
iii 
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DEFINITIONS 
Before delving directly into the problems with which 
this study is to deal, it may be well to devote some brief 
time and space to the purpose of defining, and providing 
specific information about, terms which will be used. 
_A. Section 315 of the Communications Act of 1934 
"If any licensee shall permit a.ny person who is a 
legally qualified candidate for any public office 
to use a broadcasting station, he shall afford equal 
opportunities to all other such candidates for that 
office in the use of such. broadcasting station, and 
the C.ommis.s1on shall make rules and regulations to 
carry this provision 1nto.effect: Provided, That such 
licensee sha.llha.:ve no power of censorship over the 
material broadcast under the provisions of this sec-
tion~ No obligation is hereby imposed upon any licen-
see to al.low. the use of its station by a..YJ.y such can-
didate."l 
Section 315 of the Communications Act of 1934 will be 
the subject of much future discussion~ A prerequisite for 
the understanding of this discussion is the knowledge of 
exactly when Section 315 is in effect. Study reveals that . 
Section 315 is in effect only after a broadcast by a legally 
1 ~ ~--Communications_ Act. of ~--· Jf.tih .. Amendments -~ Index 
Thereto, Published by the Federal Communications Commis-
sion, Revised to September 1, 1948, Section 315, p~ 38. 
'i 
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qualified candidate for publ~c office has actually taken 
place~ Stated in a Brief of.~- National_Association of 
Radio. and Television_ Broadcasters __ is the following: 1 
"In an undat.ed legal opinion received by the National 
Associa.t.ion of Radio and Television Broadcasters from 
the F.C.C .• , September 6, 1941, attorneys for the 
Commission recognized that Section 315 did not come 
into operation until a legally qualified candidate 
had made use of the broadcasting station. The opinion 
stated in part a.s follows: 
"'Section 315 of the Communications Act of 1934, 
as amended, requires that when .a station has per~ 
mitted use of its fac1lit~es_ by a legally quali-
fied candidate for a. particular office that it 
shall afford equal opportunities to all other 
legally quali.fied candidates for that office ••• ' 
"Finally, only last year the Circuit Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit held this interpretation to be 
froper. (\'Ieiss v. Los ~eles Broadcastins Co., 163 F~ 2nd) 313, (C. C .A. """§T ••• 
*** 
"Summarizing, the Weiss_case held that Section 315 
does not come into operation until there are t~ro or 
more legally gualif.ied candidates :f'or the same public 
office and. a licensee has permitted one such candidate 
:f'or thatOffice to use a. broadcasting station, and 
another such candidate seeks equal opportunities in 
the use of the station~" 
B. De:f'amation_ 
"Defamat.ion generally is the publication to one or 
more persons by words, pictures, signs or any other 
means. o:f' conveying thought, o:r opinion or in:f'ormation 
tending either to blacken the memory of an identifia-
ble person who is dead or the reputation of one who is 
alive and expose him to public hatred, contempt or ri-
1. Brie:f' o:f' the National Assoc.iation of Radio and Television 
Broadcastera, In re Application of-port Huron Broadcast-
ing Company \ l'THLS), Port HUron, Michigan, For Renewal of 
License, Docket No. 6987, File No. B2-R-976, ~my 7, 1948, 
p~ 7. 
===--:-----~·--:;:-;::---~---_-___ ---·=---'==--=-: ..... . 
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dicule~ Examples a.re charges, imputat.ions or innuen-
does of crime, immorality, loathsome disease, incom-
petence in one's trade, business or profession, dis-
loyalty to country, family or friends, atc •••• "l 
"The tort lies not in the hurt to the defamed par-
ty's feelings, but in the injury caused his reputa-
tion - the feelings toward him entertained by other 
persons. Thus, it is essential that the defamatory 
utterance be communicated to someone other than the 
defamed - that it be 'published'. 11 2 
c. Differentiation Between Libel and Slander 
Before the days of radio and television it was but a 
small problem to determine whether a defamation was libel 
or slander. These ware two explicit classifications. The 
old common law ruling held that a defamation which had taken 
an oral.form was slander; a defamation which had taken a 
written form was libel. " ••• The label was of considerable 
significance to the complaining party, for proof of damages 
was not required of a complainant in libel, the existence of 
ii damages being presum.ed from the mere fact of publication. In 
,. 
slander, however, proof of damage was required in all but a•. 
few instances."3 
"As to defamation by radio, the trend of judicial 
opinion has been to hold it to be libel rather than 
slander. Thus, ,Hartman v .• Winchell, 296 N.Y. 299, 73 
N.E.2d 30, 171 A.L.R. 759 (1947), held that the read-
ing of a script over the air is libel, even though the 
1. General Counsel's Office, National Association of Radio 
and Television Broadcasters, Liability of Broadcasters 
f.Q!: Def'ama.tion, September 1, 1949, P• 1-;- · 
2. Remmers, Donald H., Recent Legislative Trends in Defama-
tionJ2I. Radio, Harvard Law Review, Vol~ 64, No:-5, March, 
1951, p~ 727. 
3· Ibid. 
vi 
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listening audience does not know that a script is used. 
Cf. American :ts.w Institute, Re.statement of Torts, Vol~ 
3, p. 164, Sec. 568, Comment f, (radio broadcast is 
libel if from prepared script,.but depends on cir-
cumstances if extemporaneous)."l 
D. Strict Liability Theory 
Under the strict liability theory the simple fact of 
publication of a defamation subjects.its publisher to lia-
bility. The fact that the publisher may not have intended 
111 will is no defence~ The fact that the publication may 
have come about as a result of negligence or carelessness 
is,,likewise, no defenoe~2 
" ••• It is obvious that this rule is harsh, es-
pecially as applied to radio broadcasters who, in 
many instances have no practical means of prevent-
ing defamation, as where they carry a network pro-
gram or an ad lib live show or a pick-up from out-
side the studio. Nevertheless, in five of the states 
in ~rhich cases have been decided, strict liability 
has been imposed. They are Missouri (Coffe{ v. Mid-
land Broadcast Co., 8 F~ Supp. 889 (193 ); Ne-
braSka Sorenson v:-wood, 123 Neb. 348, 243 N.W. 82, 
82 A.L.R. 1098 (1932),.rule subsequently changed by 
statute); Oregon (Irwin v~ Ashurst, 158 Ore~ 61, 74 
P~2d 1127 (1938), rule of strict liability announced 
but defense of privilege upheld; rule subsequently 
changed by statute); Washington (Hiles v. Louis Was-
mer, Inc., 172 Wash. 466 (1933), subsequently changed 
by statUte); Wisconsin (Sint4ar v. Journal Co~, 218 
Wis. 263 (1935))~ To the contrary are Pennsylvania 
Summit Hotel Co~v. N.B.C., 336 Pa. 182, 8 A~2d 302, 
124 A.L.R. 9~(1939), holding that a station was 
not liable for ad lib remarks where it exercised due 
care in the selection of the performer, and, having 
edited the·script, had no. reason to believe that a 
defamatory extemporaneous remark would be made); 
New Jersey (Kelley v. Hoffman, 137 N.J.L. 695, 61 
1. Liability of Broadcasters, Op cit. 
2~ Remmers, Op cit. 
" 
:i 
'I 
i 
II 
A.2d 143, 5 A.L.R.2d 951 (1948), holding that a radio 
station was not liable for defamatory remarks in a· 
script unless it were shown not to have exercised 
due care); and possibly New York (see Josephson v~ 
Enickerbocker Br.oadcastino Co. , 38 N.Y. S. 2d 985 
(1942), due Iare rule applicable to extemporaneous 
statements). 
E. Privileged Broadcasts 
A complete defense to a charge of defamation is that 
the statement broadcast was "privileged". The defense of 
privilege covers the following: 
".~~fair and aMurate reports of official or public 
proceedings, e.g., courts, legislatures, administra- , 
tive agencies, county and. city councils, school boards,. 
and church or club meetings not merely social, but 
not reports of statements by public officials not 
made as part of the proceeding (Irwin v. Ashurst~.~. 
courtroom broadcast of defense attorney's argument 
held privileged); ••• fair and accurate reports of 
public records; ~ •• reasonable comment and expressions 
of opinion, made without malice, personal ill will 
or spite, about persons of interest to the public 
or seeking public apprmval, e.g., public officials 
and private persons whose activities are of a pub-
lic nature such as clergymen, political leaders, 
candidates for o:ffice, artists, writers,,actors,. etc~ 
This principle has even been extended so as to give 
the station a defense for the broadcast of material 
which >Yould be actionable as against the speaker 
himself."2 
F. Legally Qualified Candidate 
In its rules and regulations the Federal Communications 
Commission has defined a legally qualified candidate as 
follows: 
1. Liability of Broadcasters, Op cit. 
2. Ibid. Broadcasters should see also Part III, Section C, 
DISCussion of Public Issues, in report by F.c.c. entitled 
Public Service_Responsibility of Broadcast Licensees, 
P• 39• 
• J 
viii 
"Section 1~422 Def1ni.t1ons_-A 'legally qualified 
candidate means any person who ha.s publicly announced 
tha.t he is a candidate for nomination by a. convention 
of a poli ti.cal party or for nomination or election 
in a pr1ma.ry, special, or general election, municipal, 
county, state or national., and who meets the qualifi-
cations prescribed by the applicable laws to hold the 
office for which he is a candidate, so that he may be 
voted for by the electorate directly or by means of 
delegates or electors, and who 
11 (a.) ha.s qualified for a place on the ballot or 
11 (b) is eligible under the applicable la.w to be voted 
for by sticker, by writing in his name on the ballot, 
or other method and (1) ha.s been dully nominated by 
a political party which. is commonly known and regard-
ed as such, or (2) makes a substantial showing that 
he is a ~ ~ candidate for nomination or office, 
as the case may be." 
G. Retre,ctionsl 
l. See P• 43~ 
ix 
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CHAPnR I 
SECTION 315 AND POLITICAL LIBEL 
One facet of the problem of defamation via radio and 
television is that of po~itical libel. Directly concerned 
is Section 315 of the Communications Act of 1934: 
11 If any licensee shall permit any person who is a 
legally qualified candidate for any pub~ic office to 
use a broadcasting station, he shall afford equal 
opportunity to all other such candidates for that 
office in the use of such broadcasting station, and 
the Commission shall.ms.ke ~es and regul.ations to 
carry this provision into effect: Provided, That such 
licensee shall have no. power of censorship over the 
material broadcast under the.provisions of this 
section. No obligation is hereby imposed upon any 
licensee to allow the use of its station by any such 
candidate." 
At face value Section 315 may seem quite clear and posi-
tive. There can be little doubt that Congress had some die-
tinct aims in mind which it hoped would be carried to ful-
fillment by the enactment of this statute. However, the 
proof of any piece of legislation comes o~y with use and 
interpretation, and clear as it may appear. and whatever the 
aims of the Congress, Section 315 in actual practice has been 
the cause of great concern, confusion and misunderstanding 
throughout the broadcasting and telecasting industry. 
By this federal regulation a broadcast licensee may not 
censor any material broadcast over his station by a quali-
1. 
tied candidate for public office. At the same time, however, 
under the common law rule or strict liability,l which applies 
not only in I.fa.aaa.chuaetta but in many other states as well', 
should the qualified candidate in the process of utilizing 
the licensee's facilities, make,a defamatory remark, not 
only would the candidate be held liable but eo, too, would 
the broadcaster be subject to action for damages. The prob-
lem here is obvious. Broadcasters are caught in the dilemma 
or being unable to regulate what may be said over their 
facilities and at the same time being held as a "partner 
in crime", so-to-speak, if any tortious statement is uttered~ 
The cases of Sorenson v. Wood, 123 Neb. 348, 243 N.'l'l. 82 
A.L.R. 1098 (1932) and Rose v. Brown, 58 N.Y.S. 2nd 654 
(1945) point up this condition: 
"Under these decisions, if a station would otherwise be 
liable under state law for the defamation, the fact 
that it was contained in a political broadcast would 
be no defense, even though the broadcast was made un-
der the provisions of Section 315;"2 
There is another factor adding to the contusion under 
this problem. According to the final sentence of Section 
315 quoted above, a licensee is not obligated to allow the 
use of his facilities by any candidate. Yet, ,elsewhere,3 
the Communications Act states that as a. requisite for re-
1. See-p~,vii. , 
2. Liability of Broadcasters, Of• cit., P• 5. 
3. Sections 303{f), 307(a), 309 a), 3l2(b). 
ceiving and maintaining his operating license, the broad-
caster must operate in the "public interest, convenience 
and necessity." Many broadcasters feel that they would vio-
late this requisite and thus place their license in jeopardy, 
by not allowing the use of their facilities by qualified 
candidates as is their privilege under Se.ction 315. Thus, 
what appears to be an easy out for the broadcaster - that is, 
simply not allowing !BZ candidate to use his facilities -
in practice only adds to the broadcaster's confusion. This 
situation has prompted one station manager to say: 1'/e are 
"damned if we do or damned if we don't."l 
Still a third factor adding to the broadcaster's con-
fusion under Section 315 involves the Smith Act.2 The latter 
makes it a federal offense to advocate the overthrow of the 
United States Government by force and violence. Consider 
the case of a legally qualified candidate broadcasting such 
a platform over a radio station. Under Section 315 the sta-
tion is powerless to deny air time to such a candidate if 
11 previously it has granted time to another or other candi-
dates for the same office. And, furthermore, the station 
cannot even censor such a speech - again under the pro-
visions of Section 315~ By the strict liability theory 
would a station be considered equally as liable as a "co-
1. Mr. John Parsons, Station ~~ger, WBRK, Pittsfield, 
Massachusetts. 
2. For an excellent discussion of the Smith Act see Supreme 
Court Reporter, Vol. 71, Unite.d. States v. Dennis (341 
-"U.S""~~- Smith Aothco426i 42}~-'- .... - ···· .. c ·. ·. · 
publisher" for such an offense? And would this type of 
broadcast be construed as operating in the "public interest, 
convenience and necessity"? In short, is the Smith Act in-
compatible with Section 315? These.are questions which to 
date have not been answered~ There are many concerned 
broadcasters, however, .who would dearly like to know what 
the answers will someday be. 
That broadcasters are faced with such perplexing issues 
can be explained in part by the fact that common law rul-
ings on defamation is "a field of tort law formulated in 
times which could hardly have contemplated modern broad-
casting~"l Further explanation lies in the fact that the 
Communications Commission has, not prescribed satisfactory 
regulations, as it is.empowered to do under the Act,2 to 
guide broadcasters in such situations~ Indeed, it is the 
interpretation given to Section 315 by the Communications 
Commission in its famous ~ Huron decision that has 
served to thoroughly confuse and befUddle broadcast licensees~ 
By now it is obvious that in discussing this problem 
two principles must constantly be kept in mind: the power 
of the licensee under fed.eral s.tatute to cens.or defamatory 
matter from political broadcasts, and the liability, under 
state law, of the licensee for such broadcasts.3 
1. Remmers, op. cit. 
2. Section 363(r). 
3. Brief of the National Association of Radio and Television 
Broadcasters, op. cit., P• 13~ 
~ i 
:! 
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"Neither of these questions can be answered indepen-
dently of the other, for it is inconceivable that the 
Congress would command conduct violative of state law 
without protectillg·licensees from the operation of 
that law."l 
In order to understand and make just conclusions atten-
dant with the problem under the law as it stands, it is 
necessary to gain a thorough knowledge of the following: (1) 
the ruling by the majority decision of the Federal. Communi-
cations Commission in the ~ HUron case, wherein is con-
tained the crux of the entire issue of political libel and 
Section 315; (2) the reasoning behind the separate opinion 
of Commissioner Jones; and (3) the argument prepared and 
presented by the National Association of Radio and Tele-
vision Broadcasters in its Brief regarding the ~ Huron 
decision. 
In its decree in this case, the Commission traced "the 
legislative history of Section 315":2 
"The legislative history of Section 315 makes it 
abundantly clear that Congress did not intend licensees 
to have any right of censorship over political broad-
casts. That section was taken over without change 
from Section .18 of the Radio Act of 1927, 44 Stat~, 
1162. In the Senate Draft of the bill Section 18 con-
tained both the existing prohibition against any cen-
sorship by the licens.ee and a. provision that a licen-
see 'shall not be liable to criminal or civil action 
by reason of any uncensored utterances thus broadcast.' 
See H.R. 9971, Sec. 4, 69th Cong. 1st Seas; as report-
ed with Senate amendments, 1-!TB.y 6, 1926. In the course 
of the Senate debates doubt was expressed principally 
1. Ibid. 
2. F&deral Communications Commission, Decision in re Appli-
ca t1on £[.Port .. Huron Broadcast ins. Company_ (wHLS)Port 
HUron, M1ch1~, £:2!: Renwwal .2! License, Docket No;-b'987, 
'f· FHe N&.- -B2 R§7e j -p~ .. - ·· - · · ·· 
by Senator Fess of Ohio as to the power of Congress 
to make provision for a complete exemption from lia-
bility~ 67 Cons. Rae. 12503. But the Senate debates 
reveal an unqualified agreement as to the objective 
to be attained by the section that licensees should 
be prevented from cens.oring political speeches. 67 
Cons. ~· 12356, 12502-12505. The bill as passed by 
the House had contained no. provision with respect to 
political broadcasts and in conference the express 
provision for absolution from liability was elimina-
ted, although the prohibition against any censorship 
remained. No reason was. given in the conference report 
(H~ Rept~ 1886, 69th Cong~ 2nd Seas.), nor on the 
floor of either the House or Senate for the deletion 
nor was any suggestion made that the elimination of 
the additional language was in any way meant to 
weaken or limit the blanket prohibition against any 
censorship. 
" ••• And Congress has not only failed to change or 
modify in.any respect the blanket prohibition on any 
censorship of political speeches to correct the alleged 
deficiencies in the language, but in the Communications 
Act of 1934 specifically reenacted the language of 
Section 18 of the Radio Act, without change, although 
the alleged danger under existing language from 
actions against licensees for damages arising out of 
libelous remarks made during the course of a broad-
cast by a. candidate for office was expressly called 
to Congress' attention during the course of hearings 
on the Communications Act bill; Accordingly,,we are 
of the opinion that the prohibition of Section 315 
agains.t any censorship by licens.ees or political 
speeches by candidates for office is absolute, and no 
exception exists in the case of material which is 
either libelous or might tend to involve the station 
in an action for damages. In reaching this conclusion, 
however, we hold merely that the censorship prohibited 
under Section 315 or the Communications Act.includes 
the refus&1 to broadcast a speech by a. candidate for 
public office because of the allegedly libelous or 
slanderous content or the speech. Nothing 1n this 
opinion is intended.to indicate that a licensee is 
necessarily Without power to prevent the broadcast of 
statements or utterances in violation or the provi-
sions of the Communications Act or any other federal 
law on broadcasts coming within the re~uirements of 
Section 315 of the Communications Act.' 
In the two paragraphs quoted immediately above it is 
seen that when Section 315 as it now stands was being con-
sidered and drafted by Congress, the attention or the Con-
gressmen was called to the fact that licensees had not been 
relieved from liability for damages resulting from politi-
cal broadcasts, and that nevertheless, Section 315 was 
enacted in its present form. As will be seen later, this 
point is extremely important 1n view of the Commission's 
reasoning and decision 1n the Port Huron case. or course, 
it is quite evident that Congressmen are, or have been at 
some time or may be at some future date, candidates for 
public office, and that the present Section 315, affording 
no relief from liability to broadcasters and allowing no 
censorship, is directly to the advantage of all legally 
qualified candidates - including the Congressmen themselves. 
However, it would hardly seem reasonable to assume that 
congress meant to sanction the violation of any law, state 
or federal, by refusing to allow licensees to delete de-
famatory matter from broadcasts under the provisions of 
Section 315. The communications A.ct itself states that "no 
person ••• shall utter any obscene, indecent, or profane 
language,"l and that "no person ••• shall knowingly utter ••• 
any false or fraudulent signal of distress~.~n2 The Brief 
of the National Association of Radio and Television Broad-
casters, cited above, says this: 
1. Section 326. 
2~ Section 325(a), 
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"·•• Since Sec~ 414 of' the Act specif'ically states 
that its provisions do. not abridge but are in addi-
tion to existing law, and Sec. 303(r) limits the rule-
making power of' the Commission to such rules and reg-
ulations as are 'not inconsistent with law', it 
f'ollows that the Congress intended that broadcast 
licensees prevent the broadcast of' material violative 
of' any law, state or f'ederal, as well. as of' material 
violative of the Communications Act, and that the 
Commission's conclusion 'that the prohibition of' 
Section 315 against any censorship by licensees of 
political speeches by candidates for of'f'ice is abso-
lute ••• • is in error~"l 
Commissioner Jones, who concurred with the f'inal majori-
ty decision in the ~ Huron case but who highly disagreed 
with much of' the majority's reasoning, wrote a separate 
opinion, as has been noted above.2 In this opinion he re-
fers expressly to the language of the majority when he says: 
"••• The language ••• of the last two sentences in the 
paragraph (referring to the paragraph quoted on page 
6 above} is without legal ef'f'ect inasmuch as it mere-
ly states that this decision is not intended to indi-
cate that a licensee is necessarily without power to 
prevent the broadcast of statements which violate the 
Communications Act or other federal law~ There is no 
f'ind1ng that a licensee ~ possess such power and 
in the absence of such an aff'irmative interpretation 
of' the word 'censorship', it must be concluded that 
the f'inding that the prohibition against censorship 
by licensees in these matters is 'absolute', is f'inal 
and all conclusive. Indeed, it appears to me that the 
addition of the language above ref'erred to serves 
only to create conf'usion and to hold f'orth both 
promise and threat."3 
In its Brief',4 the National Association of' Radio and 
Television Broadcasters also traces the history of Section 
1. P• 12. 
2. P• 5• 
3. FCC Decision 
P• 16. 
4~ P• 14. 
rePort Huron Broadcasting Company, ep~ cit., 
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315 as rollows, making comments and observations which are 
important to our consideration or the problem: 
In "the original House bill, (H.R. 9971, 69th Cong., 
1st Sess~) Which subsequently became the Radio Act or 
1927, ••• emphasis was placed not on protecting candi-
dates rrom censorship by licensees, but on preventing 
discrimination among candidates. 
"With regard to deramation, Representative Blanton 
undertook to provide rederal regulation of defama-
tory utterances by radio, and offered an amendment 
making any person who over the radio used 'derogatory 
language arrecting the character and standing or an-
other' liable civilly and criminally, ir under the law 
or the state into which the language was transmitted 
it amounted to slander or libel. The House, sitting 
as a Committee of the lihole, adopted the amendment, 
but later rejected it by a vote of 287 to 57. Thus, 
it is clear that the House, at the time it passed the 
bill, rejected any regulation relating to political 
broadcasts and afrirmatively rerused to legislate on 
the subject or deramation by radio. 
"When the bill was considered in the Senate, it 
contained two new provisions,.added by the Senate 
Interstate Commerce Committee. Sec~ 7 of the bill 
made it a rederal orrense knowingly to utter by radio 
'any libelous or slanderous communication.' With re-
gard to broadcasts by political candidates and the 
discussion of public questions, the Senate Committee 
bill, as reported to the Senate, provided that the 
licensee, if he permitted the station to be used ror 
such purposes, 'shall make no discrimination ••• e.nd 
with respect to said matters ••• shall be deemed a common 
carrier.' There was no provision prohibiting private 
censorship or granting the licensee immunity from 
actions for defamation. However, when the bill was 
taken up by the Senate, Senator Dill proposed strik-
ing this provision and substituting what is now 
Sec. 315 with the added provision that the licensee 
'shall not be liable to criminal or civil action by 
reason of any uncensored utterances thus broadcast.' 
After debate--which was concerned mainly with the ad-
visability of deleting the 'common carrier' phrase 
and limiting the equal opportunity requirement to 
political broadcasts by candidates rather than extend-
ing it to 'the discussion or any question arfecting 
the public'-- the amendment proposed by Senator Dill 
was adopted. 
- ---- -
"In conference the bill was changed by deletins 
the provision (first contained in.the Senate bill} 
making it a crime to utter defamation by radio and 
the provision granting to licensees immunity from 
responding in damages if political speakers broad-
cast defamatory matter. The only explanation given 
for deleting the former was that made by Represen-
tative Scott, one of' the managers for the House. 
He said the question had been raised, not as to 'the 
right of Congress to put it in, but as to where the 
right of action would attach.' No explanation was 
given for dropping the immunity-from-liability clause. 
Representative Scott explained Sec. 18 of the com-
promis.e bill--which is identical with Sec. 315 of the 
present act-- as insuring 'to candidates for public 
office equal opportunities to use stations', once the 
station had granted permission to one candidate, 
but not as compelling a station 'to allow such can-
didates the use of its facilities.' 
"To summarize, it is clear that the Congress was 
primarily concerned with avoiding discriminatory 
treatment of' political candidates if' licensees de-
termined to and did make facilities-available to 
one •••• The primary prohibition placed upon the 
licensee was that he could not, once having allowed 
one candidate to speak, discriminate against other 
candidates. 
"It seems ••• certain that the members of the Con-
ference Committee determined to stay out of the 
field of defamation and to leave state laws on libel 
and slander untouched. Certainly the action of Congress 
in deleting the provision expressly extending immuni-
ty can scarcely be construed as an expression of in-
tention that complete immunity is granted. It cannot 
be suppos.ed that the immunity provision was dropped 
as superfluous, especially since doubt had been ex-
pressed as to the power of Congress to extend immuni-
ty, even by special legislation. In fact the rejec-
tion of the immunity provision must be taken as clear-
ly intending that there was to be no immunity." 
Thus begins to develop the picture of' confusion stemming 
from Section 315 of the Communications Act of 1934. Yet 
even more perplexing is the following reasoning of the 
Commission in the Port Huron decision. The quotation follows 
10~ 
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from that portion of the majority decision quoted on pages 
5 and 6 of this text: 
"The argument has been advanced that such an inter-
pretation of the Act cannot be correct, because it 
would leave the licensee in.the completely untenable 
position of being forbidden to censor speeches con-
taining libelous or other actionable material and, 
at the same time, subject to damages for any libelous 
or actionable material in such broadcasts. But this 
argument not only has no basis in the legislative 
history of the Section as explained above, but is 
based on an assumption of.the licensee's liability 
for the remarks made by the political candidates 
speaking under the section which we do not believe 
is tenable. For as we read the provisions of Section 
315, the prohibition contained therein against cen-
sorship in connection with political broadcasts 
appears clearly to constitute an occupation of the 
field by federal authority, which, under the law, 
would relieve the licensee of responsibility for 
any li~elous matter broadcast in the course of a 
speech coming within Section 315 irrespective of 
the provisions of state law. The actual speaker, 
of course, is completely liable for the contents of 
his remarks .• Section 315 of the Act does not affect 
this liability in any manner nor protect the speak-
er against civil actions for libel or slander or 
criminal prosecutions arising out of his violation 
of any federal or state law. 
* * * 
" ••• radio stations under the provisions of the Communi-
catio.ns Act in general are given freedom, within the 
broad limits of their duty to insure that their over-
all operation is in the public interest, to determine 
which programs they will carry and which they will 
not and the exact contents of such programs.. But in 
the case of political broadcasts by candidates for 
public office, no such freedom is delegated to the 
station owners. Once they determine to carry broad-
casts by a candidate they are obliged to offer, 
without censorship, wqual.opportunities to use their 
facilities to all candidates. The.conclusion is in-
escapable that Congress has occupied the field in 
connection with responsibility for. libelous matter 
in broadcasts under Section 315 •••• In the case of 
the ra.di.o station operating under Section 315 ••• the 
requirement of the federal law is clear that the 
11~ 
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message be broadcast as submitted~ Hence, it would 
appear that the station ••• is ••• relieved by opera-
tion of federal law from any responsibility f~r li-
belous material.l 
The majority opinion states that to them (the Commis-
sion) "it would appear" the station is relieved from liabil-
ity by operation of federal law~ This reasoning is entire-
ly misleading, confusing and unfair to broadcast licensees. 
The Commission has chosen in the paragraphs quoted on 
pages 5 and 6 to give a strict and unqualified interpre-
tation to Section 315~ Now the Commission, through this 
immediate opinion and through the wording 11it would appear", 
does a complete turnabout and interprets the law of Congress 
in a loose manner. Furthermore, according to the Commission's 
own previou.s reasoning, if Congress had wished to relieve 
stations from responsibility for libelous material, it would 
have done so when the specific language of Section 315 
was reenacted from Section 18 of the old Radio Act. This, 
however, Congress did not ch~to do. On this point,. then, 
no other conclusion can be drawn than that the Commission 
simply did not face the issue at hand. 
Commissioner Jones in his separate opinion, however, 
has faced the issue, and he very clearly points out the 
consequences& 
"The ruling of the majority in the proposed decision 
held that the licensee is relieved from financial 
responsibility for libelous material broadcast by 
1. FCC Decision rePort Huron Broadcasting Company, op. cit., 
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candidates. The final decision states that 'it would 
appear' that this is true. Thus it is clear that 
there is some doubt in this respect. This being so, 
it is m.ore than before unreasonable to decide this 
case 1n a manner which compels all stations to broad-
cast libelous material which. subjects them to damage 
suits. If what now 'would appear' to the Commission 
is otherwise decided by the courts, severe and un-
necessary damages will.be sustained throughout the 
radio industry."l 
The N.A.R.T.B. Brief points out2 that there never was 
any indication on the part of the Senate that broadcasters 
"enjoyed complete immunity--either by reason of any ex-
press provision in the statute or because of the operation 
of some nebulous metaphor such as 'occupied the field.'" 
"The following interchange between Senator White 
and Chairman Fly plainly reveals that neither of them 
thought that Congress had effectiv.ely 'occupied the 
field' in this respect: 
"'Senator 'ilHITE. I have .felt,, unless you give some 
control to the licensee over the spoken words, that 
certainly the licensee ought to be freed from lia-
bility for the spoken.words, just so far as we can do 
it, but I never felt sure what you could do effective-
ly. 
"'Mr. FLY. I have here, sir, the makings of a 
memorandum on that very subject. 
"'Senator WHITE. I would be glad to see it. If the 
lawyers on this committee think it can be done, they 
will not have any quarrel with me about doing it. I 
would free the stati.on from liability unless you can 
give the station an effective control over the words 
that are spoken. I do not think the station should 
be liable for things which are beyond its control~ 
"'Mr. FLY. That is right. And if we remove the con-
trol, if this Congress removes the control, then I 
1. Ibid., p. 17. 
2. p. 19. 
fr:c c-c-~c cc==-=~•~ =• _ -
II 
li 
,, 
ii 
' 
should think that the State can. hardly hold him lia-
ble,,, 
111 I will work that up 1n a memorandum.' nl 
What "appears" to the Commission to be an occupation 
of the field by the Congress and what the Congress actually 
has - or in this case, has .. n21. - done, are two: very differ-
ent and highly important factors .• The Commission felt that 
Congress 
" ••• by federal legi.slation had 'occupied the field' 
of defamation in po~itical broadcasts, thus relieving 
the station from civil liability under the state law~ 
It is obvious that the FCC had to adopt one of two 
alternatives: hold either that Congr.ess, by provid-
ing that 'such licensee shall. have no power of cen-
sorship,' meant to imply an absolute prohibition 
on censorship even of libelous or slanderous matter; 
or that these areas were to be excepted from the 
definition of 'censorship'. Choosing the former, the 
FCC.felt compelled to state further that the federal 
legislation. had occupied the field and.that no civil 
liabili.ty could thus. be impoaed in a state court on 
a station which broadcast defamatory political mater-
is.l,"2 
As has previously been noted, however,3 that which "would 
appear" to the Commission has been decided to the contrary 
by the courts. The fact that the defamation was contained in 
a political broadcast is no defense, The C~neral Counsel's 
Office of the National Asaeciatian of Radio and Television 
Broadcasters mo.st appropriately states in its pamphlet, 
Lia.b1l.ity ofBroadca.sters.for Defa.ms.tion,4 that "the Port 
1. Ibid. 
2. Remmers, op~ cit~, P• 747. 
3, Seep~ 2 supra, re Sorenson.v~ Wood and~ v. Brown~ 
4. p~ 7. 
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Huron decision is neither law nor regulation, and indeed 
has been held not even to be a reviewable 'order'~ Hous-
!2!1.~. Co. v. United States, 79F. Supp. 199 (1948)." In 
short, state courts are in no way obliged to the Port Huron 
decision. 
Pending a Judgement on the matter by the.federal courts, 
the decision of the state courts will prevail. Should the 
Supreme Court at some future date decide that the federal 
legislation has in fact occupied the field, then the state 
laws will be superseded.l However, until the Supreme Court 
chooses to so decide, or until Congress actually does occu-
PY the field in so many words, the liability of stations 
under Section 315 will continue to be decided by the state 
tribunals. 
Commissioner Jones' dis.cussion is one of the clearest 
yet to be submitted on this problem of political libel. 
His analysis truly has clear and forceful significance. He 
writes in his separate opinion:~ 
"The majority freely admit that the Commission has 
made no rules covering the specific situation; that 
there has been much confusion over this section; 
and that the licensee has no specific Commission 
rule to guide him. This is an admission that the 
Rules and Regulations are not adequate, and it is 
obvious that new rules should be adopted to guide 
all licensees in 'any situation' which might occur 
under the section. The mandate for the Commission 
to make rules prescribed by Section 315 to cover 
specific situations that may arise under the Act is 
1. Remmers, op. cit., P• 748. 
2. FCC Decision rePort Huron Broadcasting Company, op. cit., 
---'Po· -,l6rc- -- -'=:'·'·'~,--,=, 
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prescribed by Section 303(r) of the Act as follows: 
"'Make such rules and regulations and pre-
scribe such restrictions and conditions, 
not inconsistent with law,, as may be necessary 
to carry out the provisions of this chap-
ter ...• ' 
*** 
"It is the duty of this Commission to clarify and not 
confuse~ Licensees are entitled to rules and regu-
lations properly adopted in accordance with the 
Communications Act and the Administrative Proceedure 
Act which interpret the word 'censorship' as used in 
Section 315 so that they might know what to do when 
any kind of situation is presented to them; 
"Therefore, and so long as the word 'censorship' is 
interpreted as 'absolute' and this interpretation is 
unqualified by any meaningfU1cfinding by the Commission, 
it must follow that the dicta of the majority decision 
still directs that any and &11 candidates as defined 
by Section 315 and extended by Section 3.422 of the 
Commissions Rules and Regulations are free to broad-
cast anything and everything over the broadcast fa-
cilities of this country;.;. 
"The majority opinion holding that a candidate may 
broadcast anything and everything in his partisan 
political s~eeches is clearly inconsistent with 
Section 303(r) of the Communications Act in that it 
doesn't require candidates to abide by the law of 
the Communications Act as well as other applicable 
statutes, federal, .state and loc~l. Therefore, such 
'Judicial legislation' exceeds the 'rule-making 
powers' of the Commission. The reasoning of the majori-
ty opinion leads to absurdities and attributes to the 
Congress intentions wholly foreign to its thoughts 
and purposes. Certainly,.a broadcast by a qualified 
candidate for public office under existing law pre-
supposes that such candidate will abide by all appli-
cable laws and will, therefore, not commit libel, 
slander,,treason or other high crimes and misde-
meanors in high zeal or otherwise. To afford politi-
cal candidates a double standard whereby the ordinary 
citizen must abide by the law and a political candi-
date may break any law is a departure from fundamen-
tal principles of statutory construction that is far 
removed from public.interest,,convenience and necessi-
ty. 
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"The Commission still is saying that individual citi-
zens of our country will be denied .redress against 
broadcast stations which are forced by the Commission 
to be joint libelers for libelous and slanderous 
broadcasts by candidates which result in personal in-jury to them. Even if those issues were properly be-
fore us for decision rather than pronouncement of 
dicta, I consider it quite unnecessary and Wholly 
undesireable for the Commission to find as a matter 
of existing law that a radio broadcast. station is 
relieved by operation of Federal law from any re-
sponsibility for libelous material included in a 
political broadcast carried under Section 315 of the 
Act. This new legal principle and interpretation of 
basic law by the majority opinion will be binding 
upon the entire broadcast industry for an indefinite 
period of time. Although a number of authorities 
cited in the majority opinion seem to lend support 
to their obiter, no case full in point has ever been 
finally decided. It is reasonable to assume that many 
political campaigns will be held in the meantime and 
before the matter of liability is finally decided. 
Aside from damages to individuals and public insti-
tutions, who will suffer monetary damages of unde-
terminable amounts if the view of the Commission ma-jority in this case is wrong? 
"I have grave doubts of the power of this Commission 
to deal with this subject matter by the regular rule-
making proceedure provided by the statute~ The com-
mission exercises a regulatory function over those 
engaged in the business of transmitting intelligence 
by radio and wire~ This regulatory function does not 
extend to the exercise of authority to deprive a 
private citizen of redress for personal injuries 
sustained as a result of a.. libelous broadcast. The 
Congress has not specifically invaded the field of 
civil and criminal liability of a licensee with re-
ference to broadcasting. No specific authority is 
given to the Commission to create, extend, modify or 
invalidate .state statutes and rights of citizens 
thereof, respectively. Until such time as the Congress 
might amend the Act, such determination should be 
left to the judicial branch of our State and Federal 
governments when parties are properly before them 
requiring an adjudication of their rights. 
"Slander and libel statutes,, both civil and criminal, 
17~ 
have been enacted by the several states, and civil 
and criminal actions based thereon fall within the 
State authority. Defamation by radio broadcasting has 
been defined as.libel by the statutes of some states 
and as slander by the statutes of other states. The 
several states have afforded different rights of 
action for defamation limiting recovery in some oases 
to actual damages and extending recovery in other 
cases to punitive damages. A large group of states 
have statutes which provide that published retraction 
of defamation by the publisher thereof will mitigate 
the damages or limit the recovery to actual damages. 
Although the laws of the several states relating to 
defamation are not uniform, civil rights of action 
are granted to their respective citizens and in the 
absence of a specific invasion in the field by Con-
gress and a specific authority given by Congress to 
this Commission to create, extend, modify or invali-
date State statutes and the rights of citizens there-
of, respectively, this Commission cannot act with 
reference thereto. The majority should consider the 
Tenth Amendment to the Constitution: 
"'The powers not delegated to the United 
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it 
to the states, are reserved to the States 
respectively, or to the people.' 
"Therefore I conclude that the specifically delegated 
powers of this Commission cannot be stretched so that 
this servant of Congress can make such rules and 
regulations, much less assume to exercise such juris-
diction in a quasi-judicial proceeding~ 
"Since the parties are not properly before us and the 
question is not one that is before the Commission 
for decision in this case, I conclude that the dicta 
of the majority that the broadcast licensee is re-
lieved from responsibility for libelous material 
broadcast by political candidates within the meaning 
of Section 315 of the Act is oblique rule-making to 
guide all licensees hereafter wherein. the Commission 
does not possess the power in the first instance to 
make such rules as a part of its rule-making powers 
and processes. 
"The Commission has advocated amendments of Section 
315 of the Act to the Congress which would relieve 
the licensee from liability for libel by candidates 
broadcasting under Section 315. So far Congress has 
18~ 
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c.hosen to let the Section remain the same. The majori-
ty opinion now enunciates 1n this proceeding an in-
terpretation .Qf. the present .Act on all fours w1 th the 
language of the amendment it apparently felt necessary 
in the past to be made law by Congressional enact-
ment to reach the results announced in their dicta. 
In the final analysis the enunciation of this dicta 
by the majority is oblique rule-makins and does not 
conform to the intent of Congress ••• •" 
Thus has been demonstrated the problem of Section 315 
and political libel under the law as it stands. The aims 
of Congress in creating this statute are evident from the 
legislative histories of the Section as traced both by the 
Commissi.on 1n its E2!:l Huron_decision and by the N.A.R.T.B. 
in its Brief, and presented above. Clearly, Congress was 
concerned primarily with guaranteeing equal opportunity to 
all qualified candidates in the use of broadcasting facili-
ties, and with preventing discrimination among candidates 
by licensees. The "oblique" interpretation which the Com-
mission chose to give to Section 315 in the Fort Huron case, 
has not only resulted in drastic confusion within the 
broadcasting indust~ but has had the effect also of putting 
into the mouth of Congress words which the Congress never 
actually has spoken. By its own findings the Commission 
correctly submitted that if Congress had wished to relieve 
stations from liability under Section 315 the Congress 
would have done so when the specific language of said Sec-
tion was taken over from Section 18 of the Radio Act of 1927~ 
Then the Commission turned about and said it "would appear" 
Congress had relieved stations from responsibility under 
=·•· -,,., .•. , .. ··•- !;..~~ c ·c. · 
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Section 315 by its so-called "occupation of the field "• In 
the legislative history of Section 315 as traced by the N. 
A.R.T.B. Brief it was demonstrated that Congress carefully 
considered the feasability of specific language relieving 
broadcasters from liability., and that ultimately such lan-
guage was not included in the statute. 
It may be well to very briefly reiterate at this point 
the fact that the Communications Commission is not a law-
making body. State courts are in no way bound by the Com-
mission's decision in the Port Huron case. 
"This~;.(circumstance) is fortified by a consider-
ation of the principle of constitutional law evolved 
by the Supreme Court for the making of adjustments 
between state and federal authority. That principle is 
succinctly stated in Illinois Central Railroad Co~ v. 
State Public Utilities Commission where the coUrt said 
1tha.t it wouid never be held that Congress intends to 
supersede or suspend the exercise of the reserved pow-
ers of a state, even where that may be done, unless, 
and except so tar as, its purpose to do so is clearly 
manifested~ 1111 
Early in the presentation of this problem it was stated 
that the applicability of both federal and state lal7 must 
be considered conjointly. Regarding the reconcilliation of 
these two factors, the Brief of the N.A.R.T.B. reasons the 
following:2 
".,.The exercise of the reserved powers of the states 
is not to be regarded as inconsistent with the ex-
ercise of federal power by Sec. 315 where ••• the two 
can be reconciled and stand together. 
1. Brief of the N.A.R.T.B., op. cit~, p. 22. 
2. Ibid~, P• 25. 
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"In this view the Sola case (Sola Electric Co. v. 
Jefferson Electric Co., 317 U.S. 173) falls into its 
proper place and the-phrase 'occupied the field' is 
displaced by analysis as a basis for decision. That 
case announces no new principle of law. It merely re-
iterates the familiar doctrine that in the event of 
a conflict between state and federal law, the latter 
must control. But as has been shown, the field of 
defamation by radio is !!Q.1 'dominated by the sweep 
of federal statutes'; on the contrary, Congress has 
chosen not to dominate it. Hence no conflict has been 
shown and the basis for the application of the rule 
is lacking." 
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CHAPTER II 
BROADCASTS NOT OF A POLITICAL NATURE U1~ER THE 
:r.'.ASSACHUSETTS COMr-fON LAW STRICT LIABILITY THEORY 
The case just studied or deramation in a political 
broadcast is a special problem unto itselr because or the 
dirriculty which has been experienced, as a result or the 
Federal Communications Commission's interpretation of Sec-
tion 315,.in integrating both rederal and state law. How-
ever, in this chapter a number of situations will be brierly 
dealt with which are afrected by state law only - that or 
the common law liability-without-fault theory presently 
holding in }~ssachusetts. 
The law, it may be pointed out, consists to a large de-
gree of the two ingredients of pure and simple logical 
reasoning rrom the facts involved in any case, and common 
sense. Ir the broadcaster were to make steady use or these 
two elements he would find himself correctly answering many 
questions which at first seem to puzzle him~ 
Under the rules or libel and slander in Massachusetts, 
strict liability without fault is imposed upon one who 
publishes deramatory material. And, logically, all persons 
who contribute to the creation and publication or the def-
amation are also liable.l With these circumstances in mind, 
1. Socolow, A. Walter, The Law of Radio Broadcastin0 , Vol. II, (New York, Baker~oorhis-& Co., 1939), P• 858. 
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plus the accepted fact that to broadcast is to "publish",l 
the consequences in Massachusetts for the following situ-
ations2 may correctly be reasoned. 
"Program Script Prepared and Broadcast by an Agent of 
the Station - No Sponsor" 
An "agentn means a person such as an announcer employed 
by the station licensee or manager. Because the announcer 
is the station owner or operator's "agent", responsibility 
for whatever that employee does during the course of his 
employment may be attributed not only to the employee him-
self,.but also to his employer. nThe doctrine of respon-
~ superior3 imposes upon the broadcast station full 
liability for all torts committed by its servants within 
the scope of their employment. "4 Therefore, under the 
common law it is obvious that if the announcer (the "agent" 
or employee) wrote a script and announced it over the 
air defaming someone, both the announcer and his employer 
would be liable. Perhaps a third person - a script-writer -
wrote the defamatory matter. In such a case all three -
the announcer, the script-writer and the employer - would 
be liable. Even if the announc.er ad libed a defamatory 
statement,,that is, deviated from a prepared script, the 
:: 1. See p. v supra. 
2. Situations suggested by Remmers;,op. cit. 
3. "Respondeat Superior" - let the senior or superior (the 
principle) respond for his agent. From lecture by Richard 
B. Dellheim, L.L.B., Boston University, March 4, 1953. 
4. Socolow, op. cit., p. 856. 
' 
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station would still be liable also under the law of agency. 
"~.~where the employee is engaged to express the 
contents of a script or to speak extemporaneously, 
a-deviation from the script or an unauthorized 
utterance does not constitute a deviation from the 
employment. The station is liable for defamation 
committed by an employee engaged for the same gener-
al purpose which gave rise to the tort;nl 
"Program Script Prepared by Either the Agents of the 
Station or the Advertiser - Sponsored" 
There is only one direct conclusion which can be made 
in this case. Assuming that the script contained a defama-
tion which has been read over the air, not only are the 
station and its agents liable,.but so, too, is the adver-
tiser. The advertiser is, in effect, a lessee of the sta-
tion's facilities. Therefore, since it was in the sponsor's 
program that the defamation occured, the sponsor to all 
intents and purposes contributed to that defamation, and 
without doubt would be adjudged absolutely liable as a co-
contributor.2 
. 
"Program Saript Prepared and Broadcast Wholly or Par-
tially by One Not the Agent of the Station" 
This case would seem to be one of the hardest for the 
station to bear. For here is the case of one entirely un-
connected with the station, using the station's facilities, 
and in the course of such use uttering a defamatory remark~ 
From the observations in the cases above it is not diffi-
1. Socolow, op~ cit., p~ 857. 
2; As used in this paragraph "sponsor" and "advertiser" are 
one and the same person or firm. 
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cult to reason the result here. It has already been statedl 
that under Massachusetts common.law rules, strict liability 
without fault is imposed upon one who contributes to the 
publication of defamatory matter. Subsequently, even though 
the one who spoke the defamatory language was completely 
outside of the station staff, nevertheless the station has 
contributed to the defamation because its facilities pro-
vided the method of publication. 
"Defamatory Remarks by one Invited to Speak Extempor-
aneously" 
This is a similar case 1n point to the one above~ Even 
though outside the station staff, should the extemporaneous 
speaker utter a defamation, the station as a co-contribu-
tor to that defamation would be liable under the Massachu-
setts strict liability theory. With the Massachusetts law 
what it is, the only precaution a station could take 1n such 
a situation would be either to require that the speaker use 
'
1
· a carefully edited script or caution him against defamatory 
language. 
"Sundry Defamations by Intruders" 
This situation is not at all difficult to visualize, 
and in this Commonwealth could well be the cause of great 
concern to many broadcasters. Numerous radio stations broad-
cast so-called "special events" and sports programs over 
1. p~ 22 supra. 
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which a defamation could easily take place,, even though ob-
viously not so intended by the station. For example, there 
are football and baseball play-by-play broadcasts and man-
en-the-street interviews. These are but three of several 
instances in which an open microphone might pick up a li-
belous remark shouted by some onlooker or passerby~ This 
situation presents a formidable problem to the broadcaster 
which, short of not broadcasting such programs at all, is 
almost impossible to overcome~ Yet under the strict liability 
theory, Massachusetts broadcasters would be guilty in a 
court of law for "aiding" in the dissemination and publi-
cation of such a defamation. 
"Transcribed Programs" 
In the case of the transcribed program the broadcaster 
has little or no excuse for broadcasting a defamatory remark. 
Such programs,.usually recorded on "tape" or disks, can be 
11edited11 before the actual broadcast. Here the radio sta-
tion's position is similar to that of the newspaper, where 
the proofreader or editor checks each piece of copy before 
it is put into print. With such advance opportunity to de-
lete defamatory material, it seems only reasonable that ab-
solute liability should apply. 
11Political Broadcasts" 
Political broadcasts were dealt with in the foregoing 
chapter~ 
Thus far bas been discussed defamation problems of a non-
political nature as they affect the local broadcastine; sta-
tion under the Massachusetts strict liability law. To be 
discussed now are defamation problems which involve not only 
the local station but also the network with which it may be 
affiliated. In these situations the problem is elevated one 
step above the local level where the local affiliate broad-
casts defamatory statements originated by the network. 
"l'rogram Script l'repared and Broadcast by the Network -
Without Sponsor" 
From dealing with the situations outlined above it is 
obvious immediately what the answer to this problem will be. 
When a local station, broadcasting a defamatory remark in 
a program originated by its network affiliate, is located 
1n a state holding to the strict liability theory of common 
law, that local station may be held absolutely liable for 
the publication of such defamation. There is more to this 
situation, however, for the complaining party must decide 
whether he is going to prosecute only the local station or 
the network or both. The Remmers article cited above, con-
tains a clear discussion of the problems involved in such 
prosecution:l 
"The defamed party who decides to sue the offend-
ing network will be met at the outset by several 
rather formidable obstacles. In maDy instances,. it 
will be impossible to get service of process on the 
network in the state in which the suit against the 
local station is brought, (The networks have no pro-
perty in most states, the network programs be.ing 
1. P• 751. 
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carried to the outlet stations over wires leased from 
others. Exceptions are to be found in some states in 
which the networks own the outlet stations. Also, it 
is understood that the networks maintain liason offi-
cers in the more populous states, upon whom service 
might be had.) so that if the network is to be sued, 
it will be necessary to carry on the litigation in 
some distant state. Not the least of the objections 
to this would be the expense, oftentimes prohibitive, 
to the complaining party. And there would be further 
disadvantages~ Words which would clearly be found to 
be defamatory in complainant's home community might 
bring forth an entirely different res~onse from a 
~ury drawn far from his home locale. (For example, 
damn yankee' carries a connotation in the deep South 
not appreciated by New Yorkers.) In addition, if the 
plaintiff sues away from home, he would be deprived 
in large measure of the benefits of any good name 
which he had been successful in building 1n his home 
community. Further,,as a practical matter, he will 
undoubtedly consider that suit against the network will 
be likely to bring forth specialized counsel and 
costly appeals Which might be avoided in suit against 
the local station." 
"Program Script Prepared by Network or Advertising 
Agency, Broadcast by the Network ... Sponsored" 
This situation is similar to the one discussed immediate-
ly above with the added factor that both the advertising 
agency and the sponsor may be subject to equal liability 
with the local station and the network as a contributor to 
the publication of a defamation~ The liability of the spon-
sor has already been noted in connection with local, non-
network broadcasts. Usually in such a situation it is the 
advertising agency which prepares and submits the broad-
cast copy. Thus the network has ample opportunity to "edit" 
same for defamatory material~ In this case, as with the case 
of the transcribed programs, absolute liability would not 
appear unduly harsh. 
28~ 
,-_ - t:. ·-
The following chapter is devoted to fUrther discussion 
of the liability involved for broadcasting defamatory mater-
ial originating in other stations. 
The cases outlined in this chapter admittedly have had 
a. "negative" quality about them - negative from the point of 
view of the broadcaster. However, such a. presentation is in 
accord both with the intended approach to this problem of 
defamation via. radio and television and with the actual cir-
cumstances as they exist under the Massachusetts strict lia-
bility coda. Furthermore,,such a. negative view will serve 
to emphasize more candidly the future discussion of the 
attempted solution to these eases,l and the problem of defa-
mation as a whole. Several of the states which once similar-
ly held the common law stri~t liability theory, have enacted 
so-called "due care" legislation replacing the common law 
in certain specific instances of defamation via radio a.nd 
television. 
In several of the cases outlined above it was plain to 
see that although held liable for "contributing" to the pub-
lishing of a defamatory statement, the station often was 
unable to prevent it - even by the exercise of the greatest 
precaution and scrutiny. In such oases it would seem almost 
unfair to hold the broadcaster responsible. A. Walter Soco-
low expresses a similar view when he sa.ys:2 
1. See Chapter IV. 
2. Socolow, op.cit., p~ 858; 
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»The writer is inclined to the view that a broadcast 
station should be required to exercise due care only, 
since it cannot reasonably predict deviation from 
scripts previously submitted to and approved by it. 
The station does not have as complete and direct con-
trol over its program facilities as does the news-
paper publisher. It has been urged that broadcast 
stations should not be considered as publishers of 
such defamatory remarks but merely as mechanical 
factors in the process of publication. It seems fair 
to impose no responsibility upon a broadcast station 
to use more than due care in transmitting programs of 
others by means of its facilities~ 
"So long as the broadcast station actually scru-
tinizes the contents of a script submitted before 
broadcast and the defamatory matter is not contained 
therein, the standard of due care would be satisfied 
to an extent sufficient to excuse the station from 
liability for the utterance of defamatory statements 
1n deviation from such a script~ 
»The due care doctrine can be invoked by the courts 
only as a departure from the application of the law 
of libel to broadcast defamation. Although such a 
departure is within the flexible scope of common law jurisprudence, it would seem that the more effica-
cious method of achieving this desirable result would 
be the enactment of legislation by the various states.• 
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CHAPTER III 
MULTIPLE PUBLICATION RULE UNDER 
THE STRICT LIABILITY THEORY 
"Network broadcasting" and "radio waves know no state 
bounds" - these two expressions are at the base of still 
another problem concerning the transmission of defamatory 
matter over visual and sound broadcasting stations. 
Simultaneous broadcasting over a network of' several 
radio or television stations joined together by wire or 
other mechanical or electrical means, is today a widely 
acknowledged method of' program transmission. Network broad-
casts are often transmitted over what is termed a "nation-
wide hookup", meaning that a program might well be heard 
1n all of the f'orty-eight states at the same time. This 
practice gives rise to the question of liability when a 
local station, thus joined to and carrying the program of 
another originating station, broadcasts defamatory matter con-
tained in such a program. And no small part of' this question 
is that of deciding which state law should apply, the law 
of' the state "where the broadcast originated, ~ •• (the law of 
the state) where the suit is brought,.or the law of some 
other state in which the defamed party is domiciled?"l 
1. Remmers, op. cit~, p~ 732~ 
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A similar case 1n point is that which involves a defama-
tory broadcast over a so-called "clear channel" station, 
the signal of which may be heard in many states outside of 
that in which the station is itself located. "Radio waves 
know no state bounds" means simply that it is physically 
impossible to determine exactly where a radio wave terminates~ 
With this fact in mind, the possibility cannot be ruled out 
that the signal of ~.station, be it "clear channel" or of 
very low power, might be heard outside af the state wherein 
such station is located. It is for these reasons, at least 
• in part,,that the business of transmitting radio and tele-
vision programs is considered to be interstate commerce. 
In the case of Coffer. v. Midland _Broadcasting Company 
(8 F. Supp. 889, (W.D.Mo~ 1934)), the court decided that 
there was no "difference between the defamatory act of the 
speakers in the local studio and a similar act by one 
standing in a studio hundreds or thousands of miles dis-
tant and connected to the local station by wire. 111 This 
case definitely establishes that under the strict liability 
theory a broadcast station is absolutely liable for defama-
tory material transmitted by it, whether such defamatory 
matter originated in its own studios or those of some other 
station connected to it by wire. 
With this brief outline 1n mind,, it is not difficult to 
1. Socolow, op. cit., p. 861. 
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envision the situation which could easily evolve from a 
defamatory broadcast carried over a. "clear channel" sta-
>; 
tion or a "network hookup"~ Should an individual thus de-
famed desire to bring suit he might justifiably have a. diffi• 
cult time in deciding under the laws of which state or 
states so to do - this because the several states have 
varying lawa applicable to defamation. Should a. defamatory 
broadcast be carried by a. network of stations, there would 
be in actuality several separate publications of the defama-
tion, a.nd each local station would be a.bs.olutely liable for 
its publication. 
"Under the traditional 'multiple publication' rule, 
each separate publication of defamatory matter con-
stitutes a. new tort. Thus, the party can bring an 
action for each publication. or, since the action 
for defamation is a transitory one, the defamed can join his separate causes of action and sue on all of 
them in a.ny one jurisdiction in which he can get 
service on the defendant."l 
As was suggested in the preceeding chapter, both of these 
courses by the plaintiff could lead to great expense, time 
and difficulty. 
This is but another of the problems with which broad-
casters a.nd telecasters a.re faced under the common law 
theory of strict liability. In the case of Jerome fi· Remick 
~Company v. General Electric Company (16 F.(2d) 829 (S.D. 
N.Y., 1926)), the opinion wa.s that "liability should not 
be avoided on the ground that the defamatory statements were 
1. Remmers, op. cit., P• 732~ 
33;. 
broadcast by another station and merely transmitted or re-
broadcast by the local station."l As will be seen in Chap-
ter IV, several of the state legislatures have concluded 
differently about this problem, feeling that a local sta-
tion carrying a network program not only puts its trust in 
the originating station to transmit a non-tortious broad-
cast, but also has no opportunity to know in advance that 
defamatory matter will be uttered~ These legislatures have 
enacted statutes which, in such situations, hold only the 
originating station liable.2 
1. Socolow, op~ cit~, p~ 862~ 
2. See table on P• 99 showing states which hold only origi-
nating stations liable. 
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CHAPTER IV 
TRENDS IN LEGISIATION TO 
RELIEVE BROADCASTERS OF LIABILITY 
STATE LEGISLATION 
In recent years there has been a.significant trend in 
the field of state legislation regarding defamation by ra-
dio and television~ Such legislation, often known as "due 
care" legislation, generally has the effect of protecting 
radio-television owners and operators from liability for 
defamatory statements over which they have no control and 
for which they are not responsible. At the date of this 
writing, twenty-eight of the forty-eight states have enacted 
this general type of legislation, with two additional state 
legislatures1 currently considering similar statutes. From 
pages 66 to 96 in the chapter entitled "Appendices and 
Exhibits", will be found copies of the present twenty-eight 
statutes arranged in alphabetical order according to states~. 
Iowa. led the way 1n this type of legislation, when,, in 
the year 1937, the Iowa Legislature enacted the following: 
"The owner, lessee,.licensee or operator of a 
radio broadcasting station, and the agents or em-
ployees of a.ny such owner, lessee,.licensee or oper-
1. Texas and Pennsylvania.. 
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ator,,shall not be liable for any damages for any de-
famatory statement published or uttered in or as a 
part of a radio broadcast, by one other than such 
owner,,lessee, licensee, or operator or agent or em-
ployee thereof, .. if such owner, lessee, licensee, oper-
ator, agent or employee shall prove the exercise of 
due care to prevent the publicatio~ or utterance of 
such statement in such broadcast~" 
Follow1ng Iowa's lead, Montana in 1939, Oregon in 1941, 
Wyoming and Colorado 1n 1947 and V1rginia.in 1948, all en-
acted generally similar legislation~ From 1949 to the present, 
twenty-two more states have followed suit, with Arizona the 
most recent, the latter's "due care" statute having become 
law on March 10,.1953. 
While for the most part all of these statutes are 
aimed at the same common goal, nevertheless they do differ 
somewhat in latitude and design~ Donald H~ Remmers, in his 
Harvard Law Review article, Recent Legislative. Trends 1n 
Defamati.on Bl, Radio, . suggests five headings under which 
these statutes may be compared~ 2 They are: (1) persons 
exempted from liability, (2) when the exemption is given, 
(3) due care, (4) political broadcasts and (5) damages. 
Charts demonstrating how the various state regulations 
line up under these headings are included in the chapter 
entitled "Appendices and Exhibits", pages 97 to 10~~. 
Persons.Exempted FromLiability- Under this heading, 
as may be seen from the charts noted above, twenty-five of 
1. Iowa Code annotated, Sec. 659~5. 
2~ pp~ 741-745~ 
:;. 
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the states have relieved from liability the station owner, 
licensee, operator, and agents and employees of such sta-
tion owners 0 licensees and operators. One state, Iowa, in-
cludes the term "lessee". The other twenty-four statutes 
do not. As Mr. Remmers points out, 11presumably~~.(the 
lessee) would be included in the operator category."l 
The Maine, Utah and Illinois statutes are something of 
special cases. The l-1a.ine statute, as follows, says: 
11A person shall be responsible for a:ny libel pub-
lished or uttered in or as a part of a visual or 
sound radio broadcast, unless he proves on trial that 
it was broadcast and published without his knowledge, 
consent or suspicion, and that by reasonable care and 
diligence he could not have prevented it."2 
The Utah statute speaks in terms of a "person, firm or 
corporation owning or operating a radio or television broad-
casting station~.;."3 Illinois exempts from liability a 
"person, firm, corporation, or unincorporated or voluntary 
association, or employee thereof~ 114 
Twenty-three of the states extend exemption from liabil-
ity not only to the owners, operators, licensees and agents 
or employees thereof of a local station, but also to the 
owners, licensees,.operators and agents and employees there-
of of a network of stations~ 
In a .. network broadcast, the statutes of Montana, Nevada, 
1. Remmers, op. cit~, p; 741~ . . 
2. Laws of Maine, 1949, Chapter 1}4, Sec. 31-A. 
3~ Utah Code Annotated, 1953, Sec~ 45-2-5; 
4; Illinois Revised Statutes, 1951, Sec. 404.2, Liability 
~ Libel 2t Radio, Sec. 179.2; 
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Utah and California hold only the originating station lia-
ble for a defamatory broadcast. These four states relieve 
from liability the network stations which carry the defama-
tory broadcast of the originating station. Five states -
Florida, Iowa, Illinois, Oregon and Washington - do not 
extend exemption beyond the local station. 
The Illinois and Iowa statutes are the only ones present-
ly in existence which do not include visual or television 
station owners and operators. This is undoubtedly due to the 
age of the legislation. However, according to a recent 
notice in Broadcasting-::Telecastinp; magazine,l steps are 
being taken in Illinois to remedy this situation~ A bill 
has already been passed in the Illinois Senate which would 
subject television broadcasters to the same libel laws as 
radio operators. Montana's statute, since amended in 1951, 
was a similar case in point~ 
When ~ Exemption is Given - Excepting for the statutes . 
of Utah, Illinois and Maine wherein the wording is differ-
ent as has been noted above, the remaining statutes express 
clearly that "the exemption from strict liability is given 
the station only if the defamatory words were uttered by 
one 'other than (the) ••• owner, lessee, licensee, or opera-
tor or agent or employee thereof~' 112 
1~ Broadcastinp;-Telecasti~, May 11, 1953, P• 66. 
2. Remmers,.op. cit., P• 7 2. 
:; 
~ ~ - As may be seen from the charts, eighteen of 
the existing statutes relieve the station from liability 
when due care has been exercised to prevent the publication 
or utterance of the defamation~ Thirteen statutes lay upon 
the complaining party the burden of proof of lack of due 
care by the station, while California, Colorado,.Iowa,. 
];Iinnesota.·and Nevada. rest the burden or proof or exercise 
of due care on the owner, lessee, licensee, operator,, agent 
or employee - whoever is being sued. The statutes of Idaho, 
Illinois, Maine, Maryland, Missouri, I·!ontane.:t North Carolina, 
North Dakota, South Carolina·and Washington make no mention 
of the language "due care"~ Idaho's is a. special statute 
relieving only for political broadcasts, as likewise are 
the statutes or Missouri, Ma.ryland and South Carolina. The 
language of the Maine law has previously been presented~l 
North Carolina holds that: 
"The owner, licensee or operatcr of a visual or sound 
radio broadcasting station or network of stations; 
and the agents or employees ••• shall not be liable for 
any defamatory statement published or uttered.~.un­
less such owner,, licensee or operator shall be guilty 
of ne1711gence in permitting any such defamatory state-
ment. 2 
The J.!ontane. legislation holds that no "· •• owner, licensee: 
or operator~~.is liable to any prosecution.~.except upon 
proof of malice •• ~."3 
1. See p~ 37 supra. 
2. North Carolina General Statutes, Chapter 99, Section 5; 
3; Revised Code_s of 1-iont.ana, 1947, Section 94-2807, as 
amended by Chapter 13, Laws of 1951; 
39~ 
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Thus f'a.r the language "due care" has been dealt with at 
some length. Certainly the question may legitimately be 
raised as to what exactly constitutes "due care"? Mr. 
Remmers notes: 1 
"In the abeence of' any case law, it is not known just what station conduct will be held to be due care 
••• 
" ••• It will not be easy for the station to deter-
mine what conduct it may engage in and what precaution-
ary measures it must take to assure that it will be 
held to have exercised due care in compliance with 
the statute." 
This, of' course, is a problem f'or the broadcaster~ What 
constitutes due care has never been specifically defined~ 
Undoubtedly it would be most difficult and practically im-
possible so to do, for each case is individual unto itself' 
and must be decided ac.cording to the facts involved; In 
such a situation this writer submits that the only solu-
tion is for the broadcaster to use intelligence and common 
sense, and/or seek counsel from his attorney;.Perhaps the 
Brief of the National Association of Radio and Television 
Broadcasters,,prepared in connection with the now familiar 
~.Huron case,,states this thought as well as it can be 
stated:2 
11A.t the least, it can be expected that broadcast 
licensees will be held~~.to a standard of due care 
1n the transmission of' messages .appropriate to their 
operations~ That standard obviously requires that 
they refrain from sending messages which,, in the light 
1. Remmers, op. cit., PP• 742 and 743. 
2. p~ 29; 
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of their method of operation and of the circumstances 
of the particular case, they know or should know to 
be unlawful~ 11 
Political Broadcasts.- The problems with which licensees 
are faced in connection with the airing of political broad-
casts have already been demonstrated.l Very briefly, they 
are unable to censor such broadcasts due to federal regu-
lation, and at the same time, under the strict liability 
theory, may be held liable under state law for what is said 
in such broadcasts~-Thus far a total of eighteen states 
have moved to relieve the licensee from this awkward posi-
tion. Ten of the laws have the following similar language: 
"In no event.~.shall a.ny owner, licensee or operator, 
or the agents or employees of any such owner, licensee 
or operator of such a station or network of stations, 
be held liable for any damages for any defamatory 
statement uttered over the facilities of such sta-
tion or network by or on behalf of any candidate for 
public office." · 
~tlchigan, South Carolina, }ftssouri, California, Colorado,. 
Maine, Maryland and Nevada relieve stations from liability 
when "by reasons of the provisions of Federal statute or 
regulation of the Federal Communications Commission" broad-
casta by or on behalf of any candidate for public office 
cannot be censored~ Idaho's statute flatly states that: 
"The owner, licensee,,or operator of a visual or sound 
radio broadcasting station, or network of stations, 
or agents or employees of any such owner, licensee or 
operator shall not be liable for any damages for any 
defamatory statement publiahed:or uttered in or as a 
part of any visual or sound radio broadcast by or on 
1. See Chapter I supra;, 
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behalf of a;n;y candidate for public office •••• nl 
And the South Carolina law relieves from liability in the 
case of political broadcasts: 
" ••• provided the ••• owner, licensee, or operator shall 
cause to be made at the conclusion of the broadcast 
the following announcement in substance: 'The broad-
cast you have just heard was not censored in accord 
with the immunity from censorship extended legally 
qualified political candidates.'"2 
42;. 
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Ten of the states have no specific language in their statutes 
relieving the station from liability in the case of defama-
tion contained in political broadcasts. 
Damases - The twenty-eight states which thus far have 
enacted the type of legislation under discussion, have pro-
vided within such legislation "that the defendant stations 
shall be liable for some damages."3 Seven states4 go beyond 
this and provide for "actual damages". The language of the 
Georgia statute provides for "actual, consequential or puni-
tive damages."5 1-!r. Remmers discusses the wording "actual 
dlamages" as follows:6 
"The use of the term 'actual' seems ill-advised, for 
its meaning in the field of defamation is far from 
precise. Presumably, something less is implied than 
1. Legislature of the State of Idaho, Thirty-second S(lssion, 
An A£:tRelatinp;. to Defamation ]2z Radio and Telecasting, 
and Exempting Broadcasters. Therefrom Under Certain Cir-
cumstances. 
2. South Carolina, R840, Hl764, Section 1~ 
3. Remmers, op. cit., P• 745. 
4. Arizona, Louisiana, Nebraska, Wyoming, Georgia,, Illinois, 
Maryland. 
5~ Code of Georgia Annotated, Sec. 105-714. 
6. Remmers, op. cit., P• 745. 
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'general damages', which are presumed to follow in 
the case of libels and certain types of slanders and 
which include wounded feelings,.injury to reputation, 
and general humiliation among one's friends. If not 
general, do 'actual' damages consist of 'special 
damages'? This latter terminology is well known to 
the law of slander and encompasses those damages of 
a pecuniary nature, such as loss of business profits, 
which are proved to have grown out of the slander. 
If such is the meaning, the statutes under examina-
tion severly restrict the damages available to the 
defamed party ~ince in most cases they will be most 
difficult to prove~" 
Some brief mention should be made here of the process 
of retraction of defamatory language in order to lessen the 
damages. The General Counsel's Office of the National Asso-
ciation of Radio and Television Broadcasters has this to 
say about the subject in point:l 
" ••• At last report, three state statutes provided 
specifically for retractions of radio defamation. In 
California a retraction broadcast within three weeks 
after demand prevents the recovery.of any damages 
except those to property,,business or occupation~ In 
Indiana the broadcast of a retraction within ten days 
after notice of the mistake or falsity of the defama-
tory words prevents the recovery of any but actual 
damages, defined to mean only damages to character, 
property, business, trade, profession or occupation. 
"In North Carolina the statute is similar to that 
of Indiana, except that there is no time specified 
within which a retraction must be made and the term 
'actual damages' is not defined." 
FEDERAL. LEGISLATION 
This chapter has thus far been concerned with demon-
strating a definite trend in state legislation designed to 
relieve licensees from responsibility for the broadcast via 
1. Liability of Broadcasters, op. cit., p. 4. 
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their facilities of defamatory material over which they 
have no control. Though it could hardly be designated as a 
trend, there has, nevertheless, been some concrete thought 
and action given to this same type of relief in the field 
of Federal legislation also. A brief discussion of such 
legislation would seem apropos at this point. 
The legislation at issue here is that introduced in the 
House of Representatives (82d Congress, 2d Session) in 
March, 1952 by v.r. Horan.l The purpose of the Horan Bill 
was "to amend Section 315 of the Comrnunications Act of 1934, ' 
with respect to the use of broadcasting facilities by can-
didates for public office."2 A copy of the Bill may be seen 
on page 106 of this text~ , 
In the Port Huron case the view expressed by the Com-
munications Commission on Section 315 held that: 
" ••• the prohibition of Section 315 against any cen-
sorship by licensees of political speeches by candi-
dates for public office is absolute, and no exception 
exists in the case of material which is either llbel-
ous or might tend to involve the station in an action 
for da.ma.ges." 
The Commission acknowledged the fact that should a licensee, ' 
in the case of a defamatory broadcast, comply with this in-
terpretation of Section 315, the licensee would be subject 
to civil action in the state courts enforcing the common 
law doctrine of strict liability. The Commission went on 
44. 
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to say, ,however, that it felt the state courts had no juris-·, 
diction in the matter because in their (the Commission's) 
opinion the Federal government, through the Communications 
Act of 1934, had "occupied the field"~ Whether this inter-
pretation by the Commission is right or wrong has thus far 
not been decided, for neither the highest council in the 
land - the Supreme Court - nor any statute has definitely 
stated yes or no whether the Federal legislation has "occu-
pied the field". Therefore, at this point licensees are stil~ 
between the devil and the sea so-to-speak. The Horan Bill,, 
which was referred to the Committee on Interstate and 
Foreign Commerce and which was subsequently eliminated in 
conference between the House and the Senate, would hardly 
solve all the problems of defamation with which broadcasters 
are faced. However, should this or a similar bill someday 
become law, then there will in actuality be a specific 
"occupation of the field" and licensees will not be held 
liable for that which they are required by Federal statute 
to broadcast. 
"The Federal Communica.ti.ons Commission has indica-
ted its belief that legislation along the lines of 
Representative Horan's proposal is constitutional, and 
has supported similar legislation in the past. A favor~ 
able attitude toward a very similar bill was expressed 
in an official memorandum submitted during the hear-
ings on s.814 •••• The FCC has noted the current pro-
posals with approval."l 
1. Lesa1Memarandum ~ Horan Bill, (H.R. 7062), National 
Association of Radio and Television Broadcasters, Gener-
,,~1 C~unsel's ~ffice,"J~e 23='-'-1~2,,p. !5,~ -~~~~~ 
I' 
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CHAPTER V 
THE MASSACHUSETTS SITUATION 
The Commonwealth of Massachusetts has no law of the 
type heretofore discussed specifically relating to defama-
tion by radio and television. In such a situation it may be 
assumed that the common law rule of strict liability without , 
fault applies.· 
Libel in I•Iassachusetts has been defined not by statute 
but by common law~ Frank L. Simpson 1n his book,, V~ssachu-
setts Law, quotes the following: 
"' ••• a. writing is a libel, if, in view of all rele-
vant circumstances, it discredits the plaintiff in the .· 
minds, not of the court,,nor of wise, thoughtful and 
tolerant men, nor of ordinarily reasonable men, but of · 
any considerable and respectable cla.s.s in the communi-
ty. The emotions, prejudices and intolerance of man-
kind must be considered in determining the effect of 
a. publication upon the standing of the plaintiff in 
the community.' 
"Insa.lls v. Hastinp;a~ .. ~.Pub. Co., 304 Mass. 
31, 22 N.E.2d 657. 1Whether a publication is defama-
tory or not presents a question as to the meaning of 
words which differs from that presented when a. written 
contract comes before a. court for construction, ••• The' 
question, therefore, whether a publication is defama-
tory or not, being dependent upon the effect produced 
upon the public, or a considerable part of it, is one 
particularly fit for trial by jury •••• •"1 
l~.Simpsonl FrankL., Massachusetts Law, (Boston Law Book 
Company), Section on Torts. 
II 
li 
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A bulletin prepared by the General Counsel's Office of 
I 
the National Association of Radio and Television Broadcasters, 
explicitly states the Massachusetts situation a.nd quotes 
the existing statutes on "retraction of libel" and "evidence 
in mitigation of damages": 
"The ••• (Commonwealth) of ].rassachusetts. has ••• (common 
law.) defining libel ••• (but it) does ••• (not) accord 
any special treatment to newspapers or radio •••• It 
may be assumed the common law rule of strict liabili-
ty applies. The case of Lothrop v. Adams, 133 Mass. 
471, 43 Am. Rep~ 528, cited in notes, 26 L.R.A. 781,. 
51 L.R.A. 466, 43 L.R.A. (N.S.) 40, 63 A.L.R. 657, 
holds that if a libel is published in a newspaper 
owned by co-partners, all the partners are liable for 
the express malice of one of them. Chapter 231, 
Sections 93 and 94 provide for mitigation of damages 
in language proba~ly applicable to radio and tele-
vision. 
G.L. (Ter. Ed.) Ch. 93: "Where the defendant in an 
ac.tion for libel, at any time after the publication 
of the libel hereinafter referred to, either before 
or after such action is brought,. but before the answer 
is required to be filed therein, gives written notice 
to the plaintiff or to his attorney of his intention 
to publish a retraction of the libel,, accompanied by 
a copy of retraction which he intends to publish, 
and the retraction is published, he may prove such 
publication a.nd, if the plaintiff does not accept the 
offer of retraction, the defendant.may prove such non-
acceptance in mitigation of damages. If within a 
reasonable time after receiving notice in writing from 
the plaintiff that he claims to be libelled the de-
fendant makes such offer and publishes a reasonable 
retraction, and such offer is not accepted, he may 
prove that the alleged libel was published in good 
faith and without malice, and, unless the proof is 
successfUlly rebutted, the plaintiff shall recover 
only for such actual damage sustained. No action of 
slander or libel shall exemplary or punitive damages 
be allowed, whether because of ac.tual malice or want 
of good faith or for any other reason. Proof of actu-
al malice shall not enhance the damages recoverable 
for injury to the plaintiff's reputation. 
__.:.-·__:_ -- -- ----
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G.L. (Ter. Ed.) Ch. 94: ''In an ac.tion for libel, the 
defendant may allege and prove in mitigation for 
damages that the plaintiff already has brought action 
for or recovered damages for, or has received or has 
agreed to receive compensation in respect of sub- , 
stantially the same libel as that for which such actio~ 
is brought. In an action for libel or slander, he may ·· 
introduce in evidence, in mitigation of damages and 
in rebuttal of evidence of actual malice, acts of the 
plaintiff which create a reasonable suspicion that 
the matters charged against him by the defendant are 
true." 
It should be noted that the N.A.R.T.B. General Counsel has 
said that Sections 93 and 94 above are probably applicable 
to radio and television, There is no evidence shown that 
they really are applicable, nor does the statute specificall~ 
mention any particular media~ 
Such laws which !4assachusetts presently possesses,, or 
rather the laws which Massachusetts lacks, create an invi-
tation to trouble for the broadcaster. An irresponsible 
person can unexpectedly broadcast defamatory material over 
a licensee's facilities, secure in the knowledge that any 
action for damages Will include not only himself but also 
the station operator or licensee who has property which can 
be taken in judgement. If anything, it would seem that such 
a situation encourases defamation via the airwaves~ That 
broadcasters do not wish to be liable for something they 
cannot regulate is only logical and sensible. 
In Chapter N it was demonstrated that many of the states, 
by the adoption of "due care" legislation, have found a 
reasonable way in which to relieve broadcasters from the 
., - -- ·-::-:-="-''-=-~ 
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many defamation problems they did not create and over which 
they often have no control. A pamphlet issued by the Nation-
al Association of Radio and Television Broadcastersl con-
tains a very good discussion of the development of the due 
care theory, and of the desirability of enacting this theory ' 
into law to replace that of common law strict liability 
with relation to radio and television defamation: 
" ••• Liability for libel and slander at common law 
was commonly considered a species of liability without· 
fault. Nevertheless, at an early date, a distinction 
was drawn between the originators of libel or slander 
and mere disseminators of it. While the originator 
remained liable, regardless of fault, the dissemina-
~ was only liable if he failed to exercise due care 
in allowing the defamation to be uttered, published 
or distributed. Thus distributors of newspapers, books 
or magazines were not made liable under circumstances 
in which they could not reasonably check or delete 
defamatory material.Similarly, proprietors of public 
halls and auditoriums were not liable for defamatory 
utterances of speakers who leased or used the premises., 
Thus, in effect, although liability was supposedly im- . 
posed for libel and slander without fault, in actuali- · 
ty a distinction was drawn in favor of those who could 
not by the exercise of due care have prevented such 
defamation. 
"Even without the aid of ••• a (due care) statute, 
••• some jurisdictions have held that radio broadcasters, 
are not liable for defamation where they have exer-
cised due care. They have done so either on ~he ground 
that the broadcaster is really a disseminator, or upon 
the ground that radio dissemination is a new sort of 
legal wrong, requiring new rules. The opinion of the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court in the Summit Hotel case 
(Summit Hotel Co. v. National Broadcasting Co .• , (1939), 
336 Pa• 182; 8 A.2d 302; 124 A.L.R. 968.), contains an 
exhaustive review of the legal authorities as well as 
a convincing argument that radio broadcasters should 
1. Suggested Statement ~-Use Before State Legislative 
Committees .l:ll Support .Qf ~ :!-1ode1 Radio. Defamation Bill, 
p. 2. (See Model Defamation Bill, l'• 54below.) 
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not be made liable if they have exercised due care, 
In Pennsylvania therefore, a (due care) statute,,, 
would not be necessary. The case of Sorenson v, Wood 
in Nebraska (123 Neb. 348; 243 N.W. 82 (1932); 82--
A.L.R. 1098) is one of the cases wherein a contrary 
view was taken, Four other state courts have taken the 
same view. Three of these states have since changed 
the rule by statute •••• 
"It is sometimes charged that (such) a statute •• , 
is 'discriminatory' to newspapers, We submit that 
this is not the case. The statute merely draws a 
reasonable distinction between the conditions under 
which newspapers and radio stations operate, Almost 
without exception, legal commentators and writers 
have criticized any attempt to apply a newspaper 
analogy to radio stations in this respect. It is 
quite true that both newspapers and radio broadcasting 
are great media of mass communication. They share 
many problems and many techniques in common. They 
serve much the same purpose in our democratic society. 
Both are equally protected by the guarantees of free 
speech and a free press, which are contained in the 
Firat Amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States. A recognition of these similarities, however, 
should not blind us to the obvious differences be-
tween newspapers and radio operation. In the case of 
a newspaper, an opportunity is presented to the proof-
reader and editor to catch, weigh and evaluate defama-
tory statements .• Every word published by a newspaper 
has been· and can be the subject of careful scrutiny, 
even considering the speed with which a modern news-
paper is produced, 
"In radio, on the other hand, a broadcaster can 
put someone on the air with a perfectly proper script, 
act in complete good faith, and nevertheless, for an 
aside extemporaneous remark by the speaker, be subject 
to suit for defamation. In other words, the broad-
caster does not have the time or the opportunity 
to protect himself which are available to the news-
paper publisher, The situation of the radio broad-
caster is much more analogous to that of the owner of 
a public hall. As ••• (was) pointed out previously, 
the owner of such a hall is not liable for defamation 
unless he participated in it or failed to exercise 
due care regarding it. Otherwise, the speaker alone 
is held liable. It seems only fair and proper that 
this rule be applied to radio broadcasting •••• 
"A number of states have abolishe.d the common law 
so;. 
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rule to a greater or lesser extent. The legislative 
trend is clearly in the direction of lessening the 
harshness of the ordinary common law rules of libel 
and slander as they apply to radio broadcasting •••• 
(Such due care) legislation has worked out satisfacto-
rily both from the standpoint of the public and from 
the standpoint of the radio broadcasting industry." 
In the Commonwealth of Massachusetts at the present time 
are approximately fifty-two broadcasting and telecasting 
stations either operating or under construction permit.l 
These fifty-two stations were contacted by letter asking 
for an expression of their opinion as to whether or not 
they favored the adoption of a radio and television defama• 
tion statute in Massachusetts.2 Twenty-six of the stations 
saw fit to respond to this query~-Of the twenty-six, eight-
een responded affirmatively, three negatively, and five 
made no commitment. Further explanation should be made 
as to the responses in the latter two categories, however. 
Of the five respondents who made no commitment two expressed 
desire to study such a law before saying whether or not 
they favored legislation of this type; one simply did not 
commit himself; and from the responses of two it was ob-
vious they had no knowledge of that which was being asked 
of them. It seemed the only category under which their 
answers could be filed was the "no commitment" column. Each 
of the three stations which responded in the negative noted 
1. Figures taken from the 1953 Broadcasting and Telecasting 
Yearbooks. 
2. See table in "Appendices and Exhibits" Chapter showing a 
list of the stations and their response - pp. 108 to 109~ 
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that they favored such legislation, but only on the federal 
level. 
That more than fifty per cent of the Massachusetts sta-
tions did not respond to the above inquiry may be due to 
one of several reasons: (1) it may be that those who did 
not answer simply have no interest; (2) it may be that they 
are simply ignorant of the facts and conditions (there is 
a strong suspicion that this is so because there is no 
state association of broadcasters in Hs.ssachusetts which 
would serve to keep the individual licensees informed on 
such subjects); (3) it may be that many believe instances 
of defamation by radio to be relatively rare. Of course, 
the latter may be true, or, on the other hand, the case 
actually may be that there are more instances of defama-
tion than are commonly recognized, with relatively few of 
the defamed parties ever realizing they have in fact been 
defamed, or, upon such realization, ever bothering to 
prosecute. 
One of the affirmative answers noted above indicated 
concern over a possible conflict between such a. state radio 
and television defamation statute and federal statutes. 
The federal statute with which the party involved was con-
cerned is Section 315 of the Communications Act. This is 
obvious evidence of the confusion experienced by broad-
casters over this section. However, as has been seen in 
, Chapter I above, there is no conflict between Section 315 
j;oc~c '-~-,~--~=- =--- ·co~.~-o.c=· ='oo.·~=~c=c .. c== · ~- --- .. _. 
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and the type of state statute under discussion, and there-
fore this party's concern is unfounded. 
Evidence has been cited in this and previous chapters 
as to the developing trend in the type of successful state 
legislation heretofore discussed. The outdatedness and in-
adequacy of the common law strict liability theory as it 
relates to defamation by radio and television has been !: 
shown. Stated above is the present Massachusetts law cover-
ing "mitigation of damages" and "retraction of libel". With 
a complete lack of specific Massachusetts legislation deal-
ing with radio and television defamation, it is proper to 
assume that the common law applies to such cases in this 
Commonwealth~ 
··----- ------- -~---­
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CHAPTER VI 
WHAT THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF 
RADIO AliD TELEVISION BROADCASTERS 
PROPOSES AS REPRESENTATIVES OF THE INDUSTRY 
The problem raised by this study has been the subject 
of broadcasters' consideration for several years~ The 
National Association of Radio and Television Broadcasters, 
the trade association to which most broadcasters currently 
belong, has been active in aiding state associations of 
broadcasters to obtain the enactment of many of the laws 
examined and quoted in Chapter IV. Several of those sta-
tutes were based on a suggested radio and television state 
defamation statute drawn up by the General Counsel's Office 
of the N.A.R.T.B. The language of this suggested statute 
will immediately be recognized: 
NARTB 
Sussested Radio and Television Defamation Statute 
Section 1. - The owner, licensee or operator of a 
visual or sound radio broadcasting station or network 
of stations, and the agents or employees of any such 
owner, licensee or operator, shall not be liable for 
any damages for any defamatory statement published or 
uttered in or as a part of a visual or sound radio 
broadcast, by one other than such owner, licensee or 
operator, or agent or employee thereof, unless it 
shall be alleged and proved by the complaining party, 
that such owner, licensee, operator or such agent or 
employee, has failed to exercise due care to prevent 
the publication or utterance of such statement in 
~-:::r-=--==--= 
such broadcast. Provided, however, the exercise of 
due care shall be construed to include a bona fide 
compliance with any federal law or the regulation of 
any federal regulatory agency. 
Section 2. - In no event, however, shall any owner, 
licensee or operator, or the agents or employees of 
any such owner, licensee or operator of such a sta-
tion or network of stations, be held liable for any 
damages for any defamatory statement uttered over 
the facilities of such station or network by or on 
behalf of any candidate for public office. 
II 
ti 
!! 
Section 3. - In any action for damages for any defama-1' 
tory statement published or uttered in or as a part of:; 
a visual or sound radio broadcast, the complaining 1 party shall be allowed only such actual damages as 
he has alleged and proved. 
"Basically ••• (this proposed statute) applies the prin-
ciples applicable to torts generally to the tort of radio 
defamation; •• "l While this is not a complicated law it is 
evident - having studied in Chapter IV the presently ex-
isting statutes - that it does not fully cover all the 
situations such a law should cover. This law provides that 
the complaining party must prove the licensee failed to 
use due care to prevent the broadcast of the defamation. 
Further, the licensee is relieved from liability in connec-
tion with political broadcasts, with specific reference 
to the fact that when a licensee has allowed defamatory 
material to be broadcast, uncensored,.in order to comply 
with federal law or the requirements of a federal regula-
tory agency, that licensee shall be considered to have ex-
ercised due care. 
1. Suggested Radio and Television Defamation Statute, General 
Counsel's Office;--NARTB, P• 2. 
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The N.A.R.T.B. states that its proposed 11bill in no 
way relieves the actual originator of the defamation from 
l1ab111ty~ 111 Yet it must be quickly pointed out that the 
proposed bill does not so state this fact in specific lan-
guage, It makes no precise ~eference as to the responsi-
bility of the person who in fact utters the defamatory 
statement. Nor does it define "privileged broadcasts" or 
cover the situation of liability for defamatory statements 
published over a network. 
Section 3 of this proposed statute reveals a strong 
bias. Here the complaining party is limited to only the 
"actual damages he has alleged and proved," thus setting 
aside at common law the distinction between libel and slan-
der.2 As was mentioned in Chapter IV, this language greatly 
restricts the damages available to the defamed party. 
~nllle such statutory language may be highly desirable from 
the point of view of the broadcaster, it is also certain to 
be detrimental and unfair to the public~ Indeed,, only 
seven of the states3 which have thus far adopted radio-
television defamation statutes have specified only "actual 
damages". Of course, it must be remembered that the N.A.R. 
T.B. proposed statute was drawn up for and by broadcasters, 
1. Suggested Statement for Use Before State 
Committees in Support of ~ ~~del .Radio 
NARTB General Counsel's Office, October, 
2. See p. vi supra. 
Lep;islative 
Defamation Bill, 
1952, P• 1.-- . 
3· Arizona, Georgia, Illinois, Louisiana, Maryland, Nebraskaj; 
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and that in the above seven cases it may at least be sus-
picioned that there wa.s a strong "lobby" working. 
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CHAPTER VII 
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 
This study has dealt with the questions attendant with 
the problem of defamation by radio and television under the 
Massachusetts strict liability theory of common law. In-
cluded in this investigation were the issues surrounding 
Section 315 of the Communications Act of 1934,.a treatment 
of specific situations wherein it was demonstrated that 
rules of absolute liability work an injustice upon the 
broadcaster, and a review of a growing trend of legisla-
tion designed to afford fair treatment to both the public 
and the broadcaster by giving better definition to, and thus 
alleviating, many radio-television defamation problems~ 
It was the Port Huron case that made the defamation 
problem accute with broadcasters. In that case the Federal 
Communications Commission interpreted Section 315 of the 
Communications Act to mean that a broadcaster who allowed 
one candidate for political office to use his broadcasting 
facilities must allow all other candidates for the same of-
fice to use the station facilities, and that the broadcaster 
could delete nothing which the candidate wished to say even 
though defamatory on its face. The Commission went on to 
58~ 
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add that licensees are relieved of responsibility by the 
operation of state law for such defamatory broadcasts un-
der Section 315 because of what the Commission called Con-
gress' "occupation of the field"~ However, the legislative 
history of the Section clearly demonstrates that Congress 
did E£1, either by explicit language or by innuendo,, re-
lieve the licensee from liability under federal or state 
law for such broadcasts. It must therefore be concluded 
that the interpretation given to Section 315 by the Com-
mission in the ~ Huron case is, in part, both inconsis-
tent and incorrect. Furthermore, since the Congress chose 
specifically not to "occupy the field", state law must 
apply. 
Inasmuch as the Communications Commission is not a legi-
slative body, state courts are in no way bound by its de-
cisions. Thus the effect of the ~ Huron decision is to 
put broadcasters in the unenviable position of being com-
pelled to accept the speeches of political candidates in 
toto, being unable to edit them without risk of their li-
cense with the FCC and yet being responsible in the State 
courts for any defamatory statements. It is submitted that 
under these circumstances it is unfair to hold a broad-
caster absolutely liable for that which, short of violation 
of federal statute, he cannot avoid. 
In Chapters II and III were demonstrated explicit in-
stances wherein licensees are not freed from liability by 
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Massachusetts law if they una~oidably permit the broadcast 
of defamatory or other unlawful material. It is submitted 
that absolute liability in these cases is unduly severe, 
and that by taking leave from the common law theory and 
by finding the station liable only when due care has not 
,, 
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been exercised to prevent the publication of the defama-
tion, a result may be obtained which is fair to both the 
broadcaster and the citizenry; Attesting to such a con-
clusion is the growing number of radio-television defama-
tion statutes being successfully utilized in an ever increas~ 
ing number of states. 
The stated purpose of this study was to determine whether 
or not there is a need for a radio-television libel pro-
tective law in 1-1a.ssachusetts.· Based upon the foregoing evi-
dence, the conclusion must be affirmative. It is therefore 
submitted that in this Commonwealth a departure from the 
common law of strict liability as pertains to defamation 
via radio and television should be made, such departure to 
take the form of specific legislation. This conclusion is 
made tangible by the suggestion of specific language for a 
proposed statute of this class for ~1a.ssachusetts:l 
All ACT 
RELATING TO DEFAUATION BY RADIO AND TELEVISION 
Be it enacted by the LegislatUre of the Commonwealth of 
1. This statute is based upon the NARTB 1-iodel Statute and 
upon the state statutes studied in Chapter IV. 
- ...., ~~ ::-_,---
o. 
~~s sa.ahusetts;: 
Section 1~ Civil liability of station owners, lessees, li-
censees, operators, or agents or employees thereof for 
defamation: 
The owner, lessee, li.censee or operator of a visual 
or sound radio broadcasting station or network of 
stations, a.nd the agents or employees of any such 
owner, lessee, licensee or operator,. shall not be 
liable for any damages for any defamatory statement 
published or uttered in or as a part of a visual or 
sound radio broadcast, by one other than such owner, 
lessee, licensee or operator, or a3ent or employee 
thereof, unless it shall be alleged and proved by 
the complaining party, that such owner, lessee,, li-
censee, operator, or such agent or employee, has 
failed to exercise due care to prevent the publica-
tion or utterance of such statement in such broadcast.·' 
Section 2. Liability for defamatory statements published 
or uttered over a. network of visual or sound radio broad-
casting stations: 
If any defamatory statement or matter is published or 
uttered in or as a part of a broadcast over the fa-
cilities of a network of visual or sound ra.dia broad-
casting stations, where two or more broadcasting 
stations were connected together simultaneously or 
by transcription, film, metal tape or other approved 
or adopted use for joint operation,.the owner, lessee, 
licensee or operator or any such station or network 
of stations, and the agents or employees thereof, 
other than the owner, lessee, licensee or operator 
of the station, or network of stations, originating 
such broadcast, and the agents .or employees thereof, 
shall in no event be liable for any damages for any 
such defamatory statement or matter. 
Section 3. Defamatory statements by or on behalf of, or in 
opposition to, a candidate for public office: 
In no event, however, shall any owner, lessee, licensee 
or operator of such a visual or sound radio broad-
casting station or network of stations, or the agents 
or employees thereof, be liable for any damages for 
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any defamatory statement or matter published or 
uttered by one other than such owner,. lessee, licensee , 
or operator, or agents or employees thereof, in or as 
a part of a visual or sound radio broadcast by or on 
behalf of, or in opposition to, any candidate for 
public office, which statement or matter is not sub• ject to censorship or control by reason of any feder-
al statute or any ruling or order of the Federal 
Communications Commission made pursuant thereto, PRO-
VIDED the said owner, lessee, licensee, operator or 
agents or employees shall cause to be made at the con-
clusion of the broadcast the following announcement 
in substance: "The broadcast you have just heard 
was not censored in accord with the immunity from 
censorship extended legally qualified candida.tes~ 11 
Section 4. Damages recoverable for defamatory statements: 
In any action against any owner, lessee, licensee, or 
operator, or the agents or employees of any owner, 
lessee, licensee or operator, of a. visual or sound 
radio broadcasting station or network of stations 
for damages for any defamatory statement published or 
uttered in or as a part of a visual or sound radio 
broadcast, the complaining party shall be allowed 
only such actual and special damages as he has alleged 
and proved. 
Section 5. Responsibility of persons making defamatory 
statements: 
Nothing contained in this act shall be construed to 
relieve any person broadcasting over a radio or tele-
vision station from liability under the law of libel 
and defamation. Nor shall anything in this act be 
construed to relieve any owner, lessee, licensee or 
operator of a visual or sound broadcasting station 
from liability under the law of libel and defamation 
on account of any broadcast prepared or made by any 
such owner, lessee, licensee or operator, or by any 
agent or employee thereof in the course of his employ-
ment. 
Section 6. Privileged broadcast not libelous per se, de-
fined: 
A privileged broadcast which shall not be considered 
as libelous, slanderous or defamatory per se,.ia one 
made: 
_-:--__:_-:-:---:-----;;--= 
1. In the proper discharge of an official duty,. when 
no malice is proved~ 
2. In any broadcast of or any statement made in 
any legislative or judicial proceeding, or in 
any other official proceeding authorized by law, 
or by the legislative forum rules~ 
3. By a fair and true report, without malice, of a judicial, legislative, or other public official . 
proceeding, or of anything said in the course there~ 
of, or of a charge or complaint made by any person ·· 
to a public official, upon which a warrant shall 
have been issued or an arrest made, or upon an in-
dictment by a grand jury~ 
4. By a fair and true report, without malice, of the 
proceedings of a public meeting, if such meeting 
was lawfully convened for a lawful purpose and 
open to the public or the broadcast of the matter 
complained of was for the public benefit as out-
lined in Part III, Section c of the Report by the 
Federal Communications Commission, Public Service 
Responsibility of Broadcas.t. Licensees, providing 
for discussion of public issues.! 
While it is hoped the foregoing study will prove to be 
of value to the broadcasters of the Commonwealth of Massa~ 
chusetts, the writer wishes to note some incidental ques-
tions raised herein which were outside the immediate scope 
of this study, but which could well afford further ps.rticu-
larized investigation. For example, there is grave doubt 
as to the compatibility of Section 315 of the Communications 
Act and the Smith Act. Examination is needed as to what 
further rules and regulations·are required from the Feder-
l. Public .. ' Service Responsibility of Broadcast Licensees, a l 
Report by the Federal Communications Commission dB.ted . 
March 7, 1946, .is also commonly known as the "Blue Book";) 
. ---- - -----"_;;;._- 7 ::::___-__ --=~-= 
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al Communications Commission to guide broadcasters in the 
use of Section 31:;, for it can hardly be construed as oper--
ating in the public interest, convenience and necessity 
when a broadcaster must allow the use of his facilities by 
a legally qualified candidate for what he knows or strongly 
suspects will be a speech containing defamatory utterances. 
Investigation of thes.e questions could result in worthy 
contributions not only to Massachusetts broadcasters but to 
broadcasters on a nationwide scale as well. 
:., 
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CHAPTER VIII 
APPE1~ICES AND EXHIBITS 
1. State Defamation Statutes. 
2. Charts Demonstrating the Scope of the State Defamation 
Statutes. 
3. The Horan Bill. 
4. Letter to ¥~ssachusetts Stations. 
5. Chart Demonstrating Station Response. 
6. Letters From Massachusetts Stations. 
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State of Arizona 
Senate 
ARIZONA 
Twenty-first Legislature 
First Regular Session 
CHAPTER 20 
SENATE BILL NO, 93 
AN ACT 
Relating to defamation by radio and television; providing 
conditions under which an owner, licensee or operator 
of radio or television broadcasting stations shall be 
liable for defamatory statements; relating to liabili-
ty for defamatory statements by or on behalf of candi-
dates for public office, and fixing the measure of 
damages for defamatory statements published or uttered 
as a part of a radio or television broadcast. 
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the State of Arizona.: 
Section 1. The owner, licensee or operator of a visual 
or sound radio broadcasting station or network of stations, 
and the agents or employees of any such owner, licensee or 
operator shall not be liable. for any damages for any defama-
tory statement published or uttered 1n or as a part of a 
visual or sound radio broadcast, by one other than such own- • 
er, licensee or operator, or agent or employee thereof, un-
less it shall be alleged and proved by the complaining party,, 
that such owner, licensee, operator or such agent or em-
ployee, has failed to exercise due care to prevent the pub-
lication or utterance of such statement in such broadcast. 
Provided, however, the exercise of due care shall be con-
strued to include a bona fide compliance with any federal 
law or the regulation of a.ny federal regulatory agency. 
Section 2. In no event, however, shall any owner, li-
censee or operator, or the agents or employees of ar~ ·such 
owner, licensee or operator of such a station or network of 
stations, be held liable for any damages for a.ny defama-
tory statement uttered over the facilities of such station 
or network by or on behalf of any candidate for public 
office. 
Section 3. In any action for damages for any defamatory 
statement published or uttered in or as a part of a visual 
or sound radio broadcast, the complaining party shall be 
allowed only such actual damages as he has alleged and proved,,. 
66. 
CALIFORNIA 
Senate Bill No~ 493 
CHAPTER 1258 
An act to add Section 48.5 to the Civil Code, relating to 
defamation by radio. 
The/people of the State of California do enact as follows: 
Section 1. Section 48~5 is added to the Civil Cod~ to 
read: 
48.5. (1) The owner, licensee or operator of a visual 
or sound radio broadcasting station or network of stations, 
and the agents or employees of any such owner, licensee or 
operator, shall not be liable for any damages for any defama...:, 
tory statement or matter published or uttered in or as a · 
part of a visual or sound radio broadcast by one other than 
such owner, licensee or operator, or agent or employee there-' 
of, if it shall be alleged and proved by such owner, licen- ' 
see or operator, or agent or employee thereof, that such 
owner, licensee or operator, or such agent or employee, 
has exercised due care to prevent the publication or utter-
ance of such statement or matter in such broadcast. 
(2) If any defamatory statement or matter is published 
or uttered 1n or as a part of a broadcast over the facili-
ties of a network of visual or sound radio broadcasting sta-
tions, the owner, licensee or operator of any such station, 
or network of stations, and the agents or employees there-
of, other than the owner, licensee or operator of the sta-
tion, or network of stations, originating such broadcast, 
and the agents or employees thereof, shall in no event be 
liable for any damages for any such defamatory statement 
or matter. 
(3) In no event, however, shall any owner, licensee or 
operator of such station or network of stations, or the a-
gents or employees thereof, be liable for any damages for 
any defamatory statement or matter published or uttered, by 
one other than such owner, licnesee or operator, or agent 
or employee thereof, 1n or as a part of avisual or sound 
radio broadcast by or on behalf of any candidate for pub-
lic office, which broadcast cannot be censored by reason of 
the provisions of federal statute or regulation of the Fed-
eral Communications Commission. 
(4) As used 1n this Part 2, the terms "radio," "radio 
broadcast," and "broadcast," are defined to include both 
visual and sound radio broadcasting • 
. :~_,;;_=-:_:_ =--=: -=--- -- - --- . -
(5) Nothing in this section contained shall deprive any 
such owner, licensee or operator, or the agent or employee 
thereof, of any rights under any other section of this Part 
2. 
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COLORADO 
Chapter 257 
DEFAMATION BY RADIO 
House Bill No~ 74 
AN ACT RELATING TO DEFAHATION BY RADIO 
Be it Enacted by the General Assembly of the State of Color-
ado: 
Section 1. The owner, ,licens.ee or operator of a visual 
or sound radio broadcasting station or network of stations 
and the agent or employees of any such owner, licensee or 
operator, shall not be liable for any damages for any defama~ 
tory statement published or uttered in or as a part of a 
visual or sound radio broadcast,,by one other than such 
owner, licensee or operator, or agent or employee thereof 
ir in any action brought to recover such damages, such own-
er, licensee or operator, or agent or employee thereof 
alleges and proves that he exercised due care to prevent 
the publication or utterance of such statement in such broad-
cast; proyided, however, that, in no event, shall any owner, 
licnesee or operator, or the agents or employees of any 
such owner, licensee or operator of such station or network 
of stations, be held liable for any damages for any defama-
tory statement uttered over the facilities of such station 
or network of stations, by any cand1date for public office, 
or by any other person speaking for, or on behalf, of any 
candidate for public office where, by any Federal Law, rule 
or regulation, censorship of such political statements in 
advance of such utterance or publication is prohibited. 
Sect1on 2. The General Assembly hereby finds, determine~ 
and declares that this Act is necessary for the immediate 
preservation of the public peace, health and safety. 
Section 3· In the opinion of the General Assembly an 
emergencr exists; therefore, this Act shall take effect and 
oe 1n force from and after its passage. 
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FLORIDA 
Chapter 770 
CIVIL ACTIONS FOR LIBEL 
770.04 Civil liability of radio or television broad-
casting stations; care to prevent publication or utterance 
requi:bed. 
The owner, licensee or operator of a radio or televis-
ion broadcasting station, and the agents or employees of any . 
such owner, licensee or operator, shall not be liable for 
any damages for any defamatory statement published or uttere~ 
in or as a part of a radio or television broadcast, by one , 
other than such owner, licensee or operator, or general 
agent or employees thereof, unless it shall be alleged and 
proved by the complaining party, that such owner, licensee, 
operator, general agent or employee, has failed to exercise 
due care to prevent the publication or utterance of such 
statement in such broadcasts, provided, however, the exer-
cise of due care shall be construed to include the bona 
fide compliance with any federal law or the regulation of 
any federal regulatory agency. 
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GEORGIA 
Code or Georgia Annotated 
Section 105-712 Radio Broadcasting Stations; Liability 
for Defamatory Statements: 
The owner, licensee or operator of a visual or sound 
radio broadcasting station or network of stations, and the 
agents or employees or any such owner, licensee or opera-
tor, shall not be liable for any damages for any defamatory 
statement published or uttered in or as a part of a visual 
or sound radio broadcast, by one other than such o1mer, 
licensee or operator, or agent or employee thereof, unless 
it shall be all~ged and proved by the complaining party 
that such owner, licensee, operator, or such agent or em-
ployee has failed to exercise due care to prevent the pub-
lication or utterance of such statement in such broadcast~ 
105-713 Same; Liability for Political Broadcasts: 
II ,, 
[I 
In no event, however, shall any owner, licensee or oper-
ator or the agents or employees or any such owner, licnesee 
or operator of such a station or network of stations be held'' 
liable for any damages ror any deramatory statement uttered 
over the racilities of such station or network by or on be-
half or any candidate for public office. 
105-714 Same; Damages Allowable: 
In any action ror damages ror any deramatory statement 
published or uttered in or as a part or a visual or sound 
radio broadcast, the complaining party shall be allowed 
only such actual, consequential; or punitive damages as have 
been alleged and proved. 
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IDAHO 
Legislature or the State or Idaho 
Thirty-second Session 
In the House of Representatives 
H. B. No~ 51 
jl 
d 
': 
An Act Relating to Defamation by Radio and Telecasting, and 
Exempting Broadcasters Theref'rom Under Certain Circumstances •1 
Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State or Idaho: 
Section 1. The owner, licensee or operator or a visual 
or sound radio broadcasting station, or network of' stations, 
or agents or employees of' any suc.h owner, licensee or oper-
ator shall not be liable for any damages for any def'amatory 
statement published or uttered 1n or as a part of any visual 
or sound radio broadcast by or on behalr of' any candidate 
f'or public orrice; PROVIDED., HOl'lEVER, That this exemption 
f'rom liability shall not apply to any owner, licensee or 
operator, .or agent or employee or any owner,.licensee or 
operator of' such visual or sound radim broadcasting station, 
or network or stations, when such owner, licensee or opera-
tor, or agent or employee or the owner, licensee, or opera-
tor of' such visual or sound radio broadcasting station is a 
candidate for public of'rice or speaking on behalf of a can-
didate for public orfice. 
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ILLINOIS 
Illinois Revised Statutes - 1951 
Section 404.2 Liability for Libel by ~dio 8 179.2. 
Every person, firm, corporation, or unincorporated or 
volUntary association owning or operating a radio station 
within the State of Illinois, which shall broadcast a libel 
by radio, as defined above, directly or indirectly, or by 
means of electrical or other form of transcription,.and 
every person who shall amliciously and knowingly partici-
pate in the publication or the broadcast of such libel, 
shall be guilty of libel; provided, however, that 
(a) No such person, firm, corporation, or unincorporated or 
voluntary association owning or operating a radio sta-
tion in the State of Illinois., or employee thereof, 
shall be found guilty of libel for the broadcast of 
any defamatory matter of which such person, firm, cor-
poration, or unincorporated or voluntary association 
or employee thereof had no advance knowledge or oppor-
tunity or right to prevent.; and 
(b) No such person, firm, corporation, unincorporated or 
voluntary association, or employee thereof, shall be 
found guilty of libel for any statement uttered over 
the facilities of such station by ar~ candidate for 
public office. 
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IOWA 
Iowa. Code Annotated 
Section 659.5 Defamatory Statement by Radio: 
The owner, lessee,.licensee or operator of a. radio broad~ 
casting station, and the agents or employees of any such ' 
owner, lessee, .licensee or operator shall not be liable for 
any damages for any defamatory statement published or uttere4 
in or as a part of a. radio broadcast, by one other than : 
such owner, lessee, licensee or operator, or agent, or em-
ployee thereof, if such owner, lessee,,licensee, operator, 
agent or·employee shall prove the exercise of due care to 
prevent the publication or utterance of such statement in 
such broadcast 
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KANSAS 
General Statutes of Eanaas Annotated, 1949 
CHAPTER 320 
'I Section 60-746a Defamation by means of radio; liability \-rheno 
The o~mer, licensee or operator of a visual or sound 
radio broadcasting station or network of stations, and the 
agents or employees of any such owner, licensee or opera-
tor, shall not be liable for any damages for any defama-
tory statement published or uttered in or as a part of a 
visual or sound radio broadcast by one other than such own-
er~ licensee or operator, or agent or employee thereof, 
unless it shall be alleged and proved by the complaining 
party, that such owner, licensee, operator, or such agent 
or employee, has failed to exercise due care to prevent the 
publication or utterance of such statement in such broad-
cast. 
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LOUISIANA 
ACt 468 of 1950 
An Act relative to defamation by radio; exempting from civil' 
liability the owners, operators and licensees of visual or 
sound radio broadcasting stations or networks of stations, 
or the agents or employees thereof, in certain cases; re-
pealing all laws or parts of laws in conflict herewith. 
Section 1~ Be it enacted by the Legislature of Louisi-
ana, that the owner, licensee or operator of a visual or 
sound radio broadcasting station or network of stations, 
and the agents or employees of any such owner, licensee or ,: 
opera tor, shall not be liable for damages for (any)* defama.-- 'I 
tory statement published or uttered in or as a part of a 
visual or sound radio broadcast, by one other than such 
owner, licensee or operator, or agent or employee thereof, 
unless it shall be alleged and proved by the complaining 
party, that such owner, licensee, operator or such agent or 
employee, has failed to exercise due care to prevent the 
publication or utterance of such statement in such broad-
cast. 
Section 2. That, in no event, shall any owner, licensee' 
or operator, or the agents or employees of any such owner, 
licensee or operator of such a station or network of sta• 
tions be held liable for damages for any defamatory state-
ment uttered over the facilities of such station or net-
work by or on behalf of, or in opposition -:;.o, any candidate 
for public office. 
Section 3. That, in any action against any owner, 
licensee or operator, or the agents or employees of any 
owner, licensee or operator, of a vi.sual or sound radio 
broadcasting station or network of stations for damages 
for any defamatory statement published or uttered in or as . 
a part of a visual or sound radio broadcast, the complaining: 
party shall be allowed only such actual damages as he may 
prove. 
Section 4. That this Act is not intended to change the 
responsibility under the laws of this State, of any person 
or persons for any defamatory utterance made by such person ., 
or persons over a visual or sound radio broadcasting sta-
tion or network of stations. 
Section 5. That if any part or parts of this law should: 
be declared to be unconstitutional the remainder shall con-
tinue in full force and effect. 
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' *The wording of the enrolled bill appears without the word 
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"any". 
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MAINE 
Public Laws of Maine - 1949 
CHAPTER 134 
An Act to Establish and Define the Civil Liability of Radio 
Broadcasters Relative to Libel. 
Be it enacted by the People of the State of Maine as follows~; 
R. S., c. 117, ft 31-A, additional. Chapter 117 of the 
revised statutes is hereby amended by adding thereto a new 
section to be numbered 31-A and to read as follows: 
Section 31-A. Responsibility for libels by radio. A , 
person shall be responsible for any libel published or utter~d 
in or as a. part of a visual or sound radio broadcast, un- :: 
I• less he proves on trial that it wa.s broadcast and published · 
without his knowledge, consent or suspicion, and that by 
reasonable care and diligence he could not have prevented 
it. 
In no event, however, shall any person be held liable 
for any damages for a.ny defamatory statement uttered by 
another over the facilities of a visual or sound radio sta-
tion or network by or on behalf of any candidate for pub-
lic office, or in discussion of any matter referred to re-
ferendum, if such person shall have no power of censorship 
over the material broadcast. 
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MARYLAND 
Laws of Maryland - 1952 
Act 75, Section l9A 
(A) The owner, licensee or operator of a. visual or sound,: 
radio station or network o:f stations., and the agents or em-
ployees of any such owner, licensee, or operator shall not 
be liable for any damages for any defamatory or libelous 
statement published or uttered over the :facilities of such 
station or network of stations by any candidate for public 
o:ffice as to his particualr opponent or opponents :for the 
particular of:fice he seeks,.which publication or utterance 
cannot be censored by such owner, licensee, or operator '1 
under any regulation of the Federal Communications Commissio~ 
or any statute of the United States. 11 
(B) As to a possibly defamatory or libelous statement 
made by any such candidate about any person or persons other;, 
than an opponent or opponents :for the particular o:f:f1ce he ·: 
seeks, any such other person shall be limited and restricted 
in any suit or suits :for defamation or libel brought against' 
such owner, licensee, or operator, or against such agents 
or employees to such damages as may be compensatory for actuT 
al injury su:ffered; except that upon any proof of actual •. 
malice in the part of any such agents or employees in allow- ' 
ing or permitting such statements to be made, punitive dam-
ages therefore may be allowed to the person aggrieved agains~ 
the said owner or licensee, operator, agent or employee. : 
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MICHIGAN 
Act No. 221 
Public Acts of 1951 
An Act relating to actions for damages against the owners, 
licensees or operators of a radio broadcasting station or 
network of stations, for defamatory statements. 
27.1405 Liability of Visual or Sound Radio Broadcaster 
For Defamatory Statements Made in or as Part of Broadcast. 
Section 1. The owner, licensee or operator of a visual 
or sound radio broadcasting station or network of stations, 
and the agents or employees of any such owner, licensee or 
operator, shall not be liable for any damages for any de-
famatory statement published or uttered in or as a part of 
a visual or sound radio broadcast, by one other than such 
owner, licensee or operator, or agent or employee there-
oi·, unless it shall be allesed and proved by the complain-
ing party that such owner, licensee, operator, or such a-
gent or employee has failed to exercise due care to pre-
vent the publication or utterance of such statement in such 
broadcast. 
27~1406 Liability for Defamatroy Statements Made by or 
on Behalf of Candidate for Public Office. 
Section 2. The owner, licensee or operator, or the a-
gents or employees of any such owner, licensee or operator 
of such a station or network of stations, shall not be lia-
ble for any damages for any defamatory statement uttered 
over the facilities of such station or network by or on be-
half of any candidate for public office where such state-
ment is not subject to censorship or control by reason of 
any federal statute or any ruling or order of the Federal 
Communications Commission made pursuant thereto. 
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MINNESOTA 
Minnesota Statutes Annotated 
544.04~ Defense; Defamation by Radio. 
In an action for damages for any defamatory statement 
published or uttered in or as a part of a visual or sound 
radio broadcast by anyone other than the owner, licensee or , 
operator or agent or employee of any radio broadcasting 
station or network of stations, the defendant may show in 
his defense that he used due care to prevent the publica• 
tion or utterance of such statement, 
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MISSOURI 
Senate Bill No. 276 
66TH GENERAL ASSE...'IffiLY 
An Act relating to actions for damages against the owner, 
licensees or operators of a radio broadcasting station or 
network of stations, for defamatory statements by or on be-
half of candidates for public office, with an emergency 
clause. 
Be it enacted by the General As.sembly of the State of 
Missouri,.as follows: 
Section 1. The owner, licensee or operator of a visual 
or sound radio broadcasting station or network of stations, 
or the agents or employees of such owner, licensee or opera-
tor of such a station or network of stations, shall not be 
liable for any damages for any defamatory statement uttered 
over the facilities of such station or network by or on be-
half of any candidate for public office where such state-
ment is not subject to censorship or control by reason of 
any federal statute or any ruling or order of the Federal 
Communications Commission made pursuant thereto. 
II 
I' 
Section 2. This act makes clear the law as to the lia-
bility of radio broadcasting stations or networks of eta• 
tiona for defamatory statements made by or on behalf of can-
didates for public office through the facilities of such 
stations and since free and open discussion of the quali-
fications of such candidates, both in the primary and gen-
eral elections to be held during the year 1952, is necessary '' 
to enable the voters to intelligently vote at such elections, 
this act is necessary for the immediate preservation of the 
public peace, health and safety and an emergency exists 
within the meaning of the constitution. This act, therefore, 
shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage 
and approval. 
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MONTANA 
Revised Codes of Montana 1947 Annotated 
64-205 Liability of Owner of Radio Station - Libel. 
No person, firm or corporation owning or operating a 
radio broadcasting station shall be liable under the law 
of libel and defamation on account of having made its 
broadcasting facilities available to any person, whether 
a candidate for public office or any other person for dis-
cussion of controversial or any other subjects, in the ab-
sence of proof of actual malice on the part of such owner 
or operator~ 
64-206 Submission of Copy of Address. 
Any person, firm or corporation owning or operating a 
radio broadcasting station shall have the right but shall 
not be compelled to require the aubmi.ssion and permanent 
filing, in such station, of a ·copy of the complete address 
or other form of expression, if in words, intended to be 
broadcast over such station, not more than 48 hours before 
the time of the intended broadcast thereof. 
64-207 Construction of Act - Liability for Radio. 
I 
Nothing in this act contained shall be construed to re- :: 
lieve any person broadcasting over a radio station from lia- · 
bility under the law of libel and defamation. Nor shall any- ~; 
thing in this a.ct be cons.trued to relieve any person, firm ', 
or corporation owning or operating a radio broadcasting 
station from liability under the law of libel and defama-
tion on account of any broadcast prepared or made by any 
such person, firm or corporation or by any officer or em-
ployee thereof in the course of his employment; and in any ,, 
case where liability shall exist on account of any broadcast ;: 
as declared in the first clause of this sentence, in that · 
event where two or more broadcasting stations are connected 
together simultaneously or by transcription, film, metal 
tape or other approved or adopted use for joint operation, 
in the making of such broadcast, such liability shall be . 
confined and limited solely to the person, firm or corpora-
tion owning or operating the radio station which originated 
such broadcast. 
64-208 iihat Communications are Privileged. 
A privileged communication is one made: 
,, 
1. In the proper discharge of an official duty. 
2. In any legislative or judicial proceeding or in any 
other official proceeding authorized by law. 
3. In a. communication, without malice, to a. person in-
terested therein, by one who is also interested or 
by one who stands in such relation to the person in-
terested as to afford a reasonable ground for suppos-
ing the motive for the communication innocent, or 
who is requested by the person interested to give the 
information. 
4. By a fair and true report, without malice, of a ju-
dicial, legislative or other public official pro-
ceeding or of anything said in the course thereof. 
94-2807 Publishing a True Report of Public Proceedings 
Privileged. 
No reporter, editor or proprietor of any newspaper, 
nor any owner, licensee or operator of a. visual or sound 
radio broadcasting station or network of stations, nor any 
agent or employee of any such owner, licensee or operator 
is liable to any prosecution for a fare and true report of 
any judicial, legisla~ive, or other public official pro-
ceedings or of any statement, speech, argument, or debate in 
the course of the same except upon proof of malice in mak-
ing such report, which is not implied from the mere fact of 
publication or broadcast. 
I' 
NEBRASKA 
Legislative Bill 437 
An Act relating to radio broadcasting; to limit the lia-
bility for damages of the owners, licensees, or operators 
of visual or sound radio broadcasting stations or networks 
of such stations, and the agents or employees of any such 
owners, licensees, or operators, with respect to defamatory 
statements published or uttered in or as a part of a visual 
or sound radio broadcast except as prescribed; to relieve 
any such owner, licensee, or operator and the agents or em-
ployees of any such owner, licensee, or operator, from lia-
bility for damages for any defamatory statement published 
or uttered over the fac~~ities of any such station or net-
work by, on behalf of, or against any candidate for public 
office except as prescribed; and to limit the amount of re-
coverable damages for any defamatory statement published or 
uttered in or as a part of any such visual or sound radio 
broadcast. 
Be it enacted by the people of the State of Nebraska, 
Section 1. The owner, licensee or operator of a visual 
or sound radio broadcasting station or network of stations, 
and the agents or employees of any such owner, licensee, or 
operator,.shall not be liable for any damages for any defama-
tory statement published or uttered in or as a part of a 
visual or sound radio broadcast, by one other than such own-
er, licensee, or operator, or an agent or employee thereof, 
unless it shall be alleged and proved by the complaining 
party, that such owner, licensee, operator, or such agent 
or employee, has failed to exercise due care to prevent the 
publication or utterance of such statement in such broad-
cast. 
Section 2. In no event shall any owner, licensee, or 
operator, or the agents or employees of any such owner, li-
censee or operator of such a station or network of stations 
be held liable for any damages for any defamatory statement 
uttered over the facilities of such station or network by 
one other than such owner, licensee, or operator, or an 
agent or employee thereof by, on behalf of, or against any 
candidate for public office. 
Section 3· In any action for any damages for any defama-
tory statement published or uttered in or as a part of a vis-! 
ual or sound radio broadcast, the complaining party shall be 
allowed only such actual damages as he has alleg·ed and proved. 
=- ·"-.::. __ co.,_.-_..:o:::::-= 
NEVADA 
Statutes of Nevada, 1951 
CHAPTER 230 
Section 1. The owner, licensee or operator of a visual 
or sound radio broadcasting station or network of stations, 
and the agents or employees of any such owner, licensee, or 
operator, shall not be liable for any damages for any defama-
tory statement or matter published or uttered in or as a 
part of a viual or sound radio broadcast by one other than 
such owner, licensee or operator, or agent or employee there-
of, if it shall be alleged and proved by such owner, licensee 
or operator, or agent or employee thereof, that such owner, 
licensee or operator, or such agent or employee, has exer-
cised due care to prevent the publication or utterance of 
such statement or matter in such broadcast. 
Section 2. If any defamatory statement or matter is 
published or uttered in or as a part of a broadcast over 
the facilities of a network of visual or sound radio broad-
casting stations, the owner, licensee or operator of any 
such station, or network of stations, and the agents or em-
ployees thereof, other than the owner, licensee or operator 
of the station, or network of stations, originating such 
broadcast, and the agents or employees thereof, shall in no 
event be liable for any damages for any such defamatory 
statement or matter. 
Section 3. In no event, however, shall any owner, 
licensee or operator of such station or network of stations, 
or the agents or employees thereof,.be liable for any damages 
for any defamatory statement or matter published or uttered, 
by one other than such owner, licensee or operator, or agent 
or employee thereof, in or as a part of a visual or sound 
radio broadcast by or on behalf of any candidate for public 
office, which broadcast cannot be censored by reason of the 
provisions of federal statute or regulation of the Federal 
Communications Commission. 
section 4. All acta and parte of acts in conflict here-
with are hereby repealed. 
Section 5. This act shall become effective immediately 
after ita passage and approval. 
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NORTH CAROLINA 
General Statutes o~ N0 rth Carolina 
CP.APTER 99 
99-5 Negligence in Permitting De~amatory Statements by 
Others Essential to Liability o~ Operator, etc. o~ Broad-
casting Station. 
The owner, licensee or operator o~ a visual or sound 
radio broadcasting station or network o~ stations, and the 
agents or employees o~ any such owner, licensee or opera-
tor shall not be liable ~or any damage ~or any defamatory 
statement published or uttered in or as a part o~ a visual 
or sound radio broadcast, by one other than such owner, 
licensee or operator, or agent or employee thereo~, unless 
such owner, licensee or operator shall be guilty o~ negli-
gence in permitting any such de~amatory statement. 
86~ 
NORTH DAKOTA 
For an Act Relating to Defamation by Radio 
Be It Enacted by the Legislative Assembly of the State of 
North Dakota: 
Section 1~ The owner, licensee or operator of a visual 
or sound radio broadcasting station or network of stations, 
and the agents or employees of any such owner, licensee or 
operator, shall not be liable for any damages for any defama~ 
tory statement published or uttered in or as a part of a · 
visual or sound radio broadcast, by one other than such 
owner, licensee or operator., or agent or employee thereof. 
87~ 
OREGON 
Oregon Compiled Laws Annotated 
CHAPTER 303 
An Act relating to the broadcast of defamatory matter over 
the facilities of radio and television broadcasting stations, 
and defining the liability therefore. 
Be It Enacted by the People of the State of Oregon: 
Section 1. The owner, licensee or operator of a radio 
or television broadcasting station, and the agents or employ-
ees of any such owner, licensee or operator, shall not be . 
liable for any damages for any defamatory statement publishea 
or uttered in or as a part of a radio or television broad-
cast, by one other than such owner, licensee or operator, or 
agent or employe thereof, unless it shall be alleged and 
proved by the complaining party, that such owner, licensee, 
operator, agent or employe, has failed to exercise due care 
to prevent the publication or utterance of such statement 
in such broadcast. 
88~ 
SOUTH CAROLINA 
R840, Hl764 
An Act To Relieve Radio Broadcasting Stations From Liability 
For Defamatory ~~tter In Certain Cases. 
Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State of South 
Carolina: 
Section 1. The owner, licensee or operator of a visual 
or so~d radio broadcasting station or network of stations, 
and the agents or employees of any such owner, licensee or 
operator shall not be liable for any damages for any defama-
tory statement published or uttered in or as a part of a 
visual or sound radio broadcast by a candidate for politi-
cal office in those instances where, under the acts of Con-
gress or the rules and regulations of the Federal Communi-
cations Commission, the broadcasting station, or stations, 
is prohibited from censoring the material broadcast by such 
candidate, provided the said owner, licensee or operator 
shall cause to be made at the conclusion of the broadcast 
the following announcement in substance: "The broadcast you 
have just heard was not censored in accord with the immuni-
ty from censorship extended legally qualified political can-
didates." 
Section 2. All acts or parts of acts inconsistent here-
with are hereby repealed. 
Section 3. This act shall take effect upon its approval 
by the Governor. 
89~. 
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SOUTH DAKOTA 
Relating To Defamation By Radio 
CHAPTER 206 (S. B. 32) 
An Act Entitled, An Act Relating to the Liability Imposed 
by Law for Defamation by I.Jeans of Radio and the Damages 
Recoverable Therefor. 
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the State of South Da-
kota: 
Section 1. The owner, licensee or operator of a visual 
or sound radio broadcasting station or network of stations, 
and the agents or employees of any such owner, licensee or 
operator, shall not be liable for any damages for any defama• 
tory statement published or uttered in or as a part of a 
visual or sound radio broadcast, by one other than such own-
er, licensee or operator, or agent or employee thereof, un-
less it shall be alleged and proved by the complaining party, 
that such owner, licensee, operator or such agent or employee, 
has failed to exercise due care to prevent the publication 
or utterance of such statement in such broadcast. 
UTAH 
S. B. No. 134 
An Act amending Sections 45-2-5, 45-2-6, 45-2-7, and 45-2-8, 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, relating to liability for libel, 
slander, and defamation arising out of radio or television 
broadcasts and requiring the defamed party to prove lack of 
due care and repealing Section 45-2-9, Utah Code Annotated 
1953, relating to minimizing damages by retracting the 
statement under certain conditions. 
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the State of Utah: 
Section 1. Sees. 45-2-5, 45-2-6, 45-2-7, and 45-2-8, 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, are amended to read: 
45-2-5. No person, firm, or corporation wwning or operat-. 
ing a radio or television broadcasting station or network 
of stations shall be liable under the laws of libel, slander 
or defamation on account of having made its broadcasting 
facilities or network available to any person, whether a 
candidate for public office or any other person, or on 
account of having originated or broadcast a program for 
discussion of controversial or any other subjects, in the 
absence of proof of' actual malice on the part of such 
owner or operator. In no event, however, shall any such 
owner or operator be held liable for any damages for any 
defamatory statement uttered over the facilities of such 
station or network by or on behalf of any candidate for 
public office. 
45-2-6. Any person, firm, or corporation owning or 
operating a radio or television broadcasting station shall 
have the right, but shall not be compelled, to require the 
submission and.permanent filing, in such station, of a copy 
of the complete address, script, or other form of expression, 
intended to be broadcast over such station before the time · 
of the intended broadcast thereof. 
45-2-7. Nothing in this act contained shall be con-
strued to relieve any person broadcasting over a radio or 
television station from liability under the law of libel, 
slander, or defamation. Nor shall anything in this act be 
construed to relieve any person, firm, or corporation owning 
or operating a radio or television broadcasting station or 
network from liability under the law of libel, slander, or 
defamation on account of any broadcast prepared or made by 
any such person, firm, or corporation or by any officer or 
employee thereof in the course of his employment. In no event, 
91~ 
however, shall any such person, firm, or corporation be 
liable for any damages for any defamatory statement or act 
published or uttered in or as a part of a visual or sound 
broadcast unless it shall be alleged and proved by the com-
plaining party that such person, firm, or corporation has 
failed to exercise due care to prevent the publication or 
utterance of such statement or act in such broadcast. Bona 
fide compliance with any federal law or the regulation of 
any federal regulatroy agency shall be deemed to constitute 
such due care as hereinabove mentioned. 
45-2-8. In any case where liability shall exist on 
account of any broadcast where two or more broadcasting or 
television stations were connected together simultaneously 
or by transcription, film, metal tape, or other approved 
or adapted use for joint operation, in the making of such 
broadcast, such liability shall be confined and limited 
solely to the person, firm, or corporation owning or operat • 
ing the radio or television station which originated such 
broadcast. 
Section 2. Sec. 45-2-9, Utah Code Annotated 1953, is 
repealed. 
92. 
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VIRGINIA 
Code of Virginia, 1950 
§ 8-632.1. Defanatory Statements in Radio Broadcast. 
The owner, licensee or operator of a visual or sound 
radio broadcasting station or network of stations, and the 
agents or employees of any such owner, licensee or operator, 
shall not be liable for any damages for ~~y defamatory state-
ment published or uttered in or as a part of a visual or 
sound radio broadcast, by one other than such owner, licensee, 
operator or agent or employee thereof, unless 'it shall be 
a~leged and proved by the complaining party that such own-
er, licensee, operator, such agent or employee, failed to 
exercise due care to prevent the publication or utterance 
of such statement in such broadcast; provided, however, 
that 1n no event shall any owners, licensee or operator, 
or the agents or employees of any such owner, licensee or 
operator of such a station or network of stations be held 
liable for any damages for any defamatory statement broad-
cast over the facilities of such station or network by or 
on behalf of any candidate for public office. 
(1948, P• 56; Michie Suppl. 1948, ll5796b•) 
93. 
WASHINGTON 
Remington's Revised Statutes of Washington, Annotated 
998-1. Liability of OWner or Operator. 
Where the owner, licensee or operator of a radio or 
television broadcasting station or the agents or employees 
thereof, has required a person speaking over said station 
to submit a written copy of his script prior to such broad-
cast and has cut such speaker off the air as soon as reason-
ably possible in the event such speaker deviates from such 
written script, said owner, licensee or operator or the 
agents or employees thereof, shall not be liable for any 
damages, for any defamatory statement published or uttered 
by such person in or as a part of such radio or television 
broadcast unless such defamatory statements were contained 
in said written script. 
998-2. Speaker's Liability not Limited. 
Nothing herein contained shall be construed as limiting 
the liability of any speaker or his sponsor or sponsors for 
defamatory statements made by such speaker in or as a part 
of any such broadcast. 
998-3. Existing Causes of Action not Affected. 
This act shall not be applicable to or affect any cause 
of action existing at the time this act becomes effective. 
94. 
WEST VIRGI!UA 
House Bill No. 59 
An Act to amend article seven, chapter fifty-five of the 
code of West Virginia, one thousand nine hundred thirty-
one, as amended, by adding thereto a new section, desig-
nated section fourteen, relating to the duties of visual 
or sound broadcasting stations or networks to prevent de-
famatory utterances and the liability therefor. 
Be it enacted by the Legislature of i'/'est Virginia:; 
That article seven, chapter fifty-five of the code of 
West Virginia, one thousand nine hundred thirty-one, as 
amended, be amended by adding thereto a new section, des-
ignated section fourteen to read as follo'i'rs: 
Section 14. Liability of Visual or Sound Broadcasting 
Stations in Libel Cases. 
The owner, licensee or operator of a visual or sound 
radio broadcasting station or network of stations, and th~ 
agents or employees of any such owner, licensee or operator, 
shall not be liable for any damages for any defamatory 
statement published or uttered in or as a part of a visual 
or sound radio broadcast, by one other than such owner, 
licensee or operator, or agent or employee thereof, unless 
it shall be alleged and proved by the complaining party, 
that such owner, licensee, operator or such agent or.employ-
ee, has failed to exercise due care to prevent the publi-
cation or utterance of such statement in such broadcast. 
In no event, however, shall any owner, licensee or oper-
ator or the agents or employees of any such owner, licensee 
or operator of such a station or network of stations be 
held liable for any damages for any defamatory statement 
uttered over the facilities of such station or network by 
any legally qualified candidate for public office. 
95~ 
WYOMING 
Wyoming Compiled Statutes 1945, Annotated 
Section 3-8203. 
The owner, licensee or operator of a visual or sound 
radio broadcasting station or network of stations, and the 
agents or employees of any such Qwner, licensee or opera-
tor, shall not be liable for any damages for any defamatory 
statement published or uttered in or as a part of a visual 
or sound radio broadcast, or by one other than such owner, 
licensee or operator, or agent or employee thereof, unless 
it shall be alleged and proved by the complaining party, 
that such owner, licensee, operator, such agent or employ-
ee, has failed to exercise due care to prevent the publica-
tion of utterance of such statement in such broadcast. 
Section 3-8204. 
In no event, however, shall any owner, licensee or oper-
ator or the agents or employees of any such owner, licensee 
or operator of such a station or network of stations be 
held liable for any damages for any defamatory statement 
uttered over the facilities of such station or network by 
any candidate for public office. 
Section 3-8205. 
In any action for damages for any defamatory statement 
published or uttered in or as a part of a visual or sound 
radio broadcast, the complaining party shall be allowed 
only such actual damages as he has alleged and proved. 
1. 
2. 
3~ 
4~ 
5~ 
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8~ 
9'~ 
10~ 
n; 
12~ 
13. 
14~ 
State.s Now Haviiii Statutes 
Specifically Covering D~amation §[ Radio 
Arizona 15~ Missouri 
California 16. Montana::. 
Colorado 17. Nebraska 
Florida 18. Nevada 
Georgia 19. Oregon 
Iowa 20. North Carolina 
Idaho 21. North Dakota 
Illinois 22~ South Carolina 
Kansas 23. South Dakota· 
Louisiana 24. Utah: 
Maine 25. Virginia 
Maryland 26. Washington 
Hichiga.n 27. West Virginia 
Minnesota.-. 28. Wyoming 
New Jersey - "New Jersey has no state statute upon the 
specific point of defamation by radio. However, ita courts 
have held that a radio station is not liable for defamatory 
statements in a script unless it is. shown that 1t has not 
exercised 'due care'. Kelly v. ~offma.n, 137 N.J.L. 695, 61 
A.2d 143, 5 A.L.R. 2d 951, (194 ) • 111 
New York -'~ew York has no statute covering the specific 
poinr-of defamation by radio, presumably the common law 
rules a. pply; but see Joseryson v. Knickerbocker Broadcast-
ing Co., 38 N.Y.S. 2d 985 1942) holding the broadcaster 
liable for extemporaneous defamatory statements only in the 
absence of 'due care'. "2 
1. N.A.R.T.B. General Counsel's Office, May, 1952. 
2. Ibid. 
;: 
Persona Exempted ~ Liability 
Statutes Exempting 
OWner, Licensee, 
Operator and Agents 
or Employees of Such 
OWner, Licensee or 
Operator 
States 
Including 
in Exemption 
the Term 
nLessee 11 
1. Arizona 
2. California 
3· Colorado 
4. Florida 
5. Georgia 
6. Idaho 
7. Iowa 
8. Kansas 
9. Louisiana 
10. Maryland 
11~ Michigan 
12~ Minnesota 
13~ -Missouri 
14. ].!ontana 
15. Nebraska 
16, Nevada 
17. Oregon 
18~ North Carolina 
19~-North Dakota 
20. South Carolina 
21. South Dakota 
22. Virginia 
23. Washington 
24. West Virginia 
25. Wyoming 
1. Iowa 
All other states 
do not include 
the term "lessee". 
The statutes of' Illinois, ].mine and Utah are special cases: 
Illinois -
Maine - -
Utah - - -
exempts from liability a "person, firm, cor-
poration, or unincorporated or voluntary 
association, or employee thereof'." 
exempts from liability "a. person." 
exempts from liability a. "person,. firm or 
corporation~" 
Persons Exempted ~Liability 
Statutes Extending 
Exemption Beyond 
Local Station 
to Include 
Network of Stations 
1. Arizona 
2. California 
3· Colorado 
'4. Georgia 
5. Idaho 
6. Kansas 
7. Louisiana 
8. :1-fa.ine 
9. :1-fa.ryland 
10~ I•!ichigan 
11. Minnesota 
12~ Missouri 
13~ I•!ontana 
14. Nebraska 
15. Nevada 
16. North Carolina 
17. North Dakota 
18. South Carolina. 
19. South Dakota 
20. Utah 
21. Virginia 
22. West Virginia 
23. Wyoming 
Statutes Holding Only Origina.tins 
Station Liable, and Relieving Network 
Stations Carrying Defamatory Broad-
casts of Originating Station 
1. California 
2. Hontana 
3· Nevada 
4. Utah 
Statutes 
Not Extending 
Exemption 
Beyond 
Local Station 
1. Florida 
2. Iowa 
3~ Illinois 
4~ Oregon 
5~ Washington 
99~ 
Persons Exempted From Liability 
Statutes Including 
Exemption or Visual 
or Television Stations, 
or Network of Visual 
or Television Stations 
1. Arizona 
2. California 
3. Colorado 
4. Florida 
5, GeorgJ.a 
6. Idaho 
7. Kansas 
8. Louisiana 
9. Maine 
10; Haryland 
n; Michigan 
12. 1Y!innesota 
13. !Ussouri 
14~ Montana 
15. Nebraska 
16. Nevada 
17~ Oregon 
18. North Carolina 
19. North Dakota 
20. South Carolina 
21. South Dakota 
22. Utah 
23. Virginia 
24. i'lashington 
25. West Virginia 
26. i'lyoming 
Statutes Not Including 
Exemption of Visual 
or Television Stations, 
or Network of Visual 
or Television Stations 
1. Illinois 
2~ Iowa 
100. 
1. 
2. 
3· 4. 
5· 6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11~ 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16~ 
17. 
18. 
19. 
20. 
21. 
22. 
23. 
24. 
25. 
When Exemption is Given 
From Strict Liabilit Given When Def'amato '\"lords 
One Other Than the ••• Owner Lessee Licensee, 
or Agent or Employee Thereof 
Arizona 
Calif'ornia 
Colorado 
Florida 
Georgia 
Idaho - Applies only to broadcast by candidate f'or 
Iowa public of'f'ice. 
Kansas 
Louisiana 
I~yland - Applies only to broadcast by candidate :ror 
Michigan public off'ice. 
¥dnnesota 
:t-tlssouri 
Montana 
Nebraska 
Nevada 
Oregon 
North Carolina. 
North Dakota 
So1.,tth Carolina 
South Dakota 
Virginia . 
Washington 
West Virginiac 
Wyoming 
• 
The language of' the statutes o:r Illinois, ~mine and Utah 
dif'fer :rrom that of' the statutes listed above, as may be 
seen by examination of' the texts of the legislation of 
these three sta.tes.l 
1. See pages 73, 77 and 91 above. 
101~ 
Statutes Relieving From Liability 
When "Due Care" Has Been Exercised 
1. Arizona 
2. California 
3. Colorado 
4. Florida 
5. Georgia 
6. Iowa 
7. Kansas 
8. Louisiana 
9· Michigan 
10~ IUnnesota 
11. Nebraska 
12. Nevada 
13~ Oregon 
14. South Dakota 
15~ Utah 
16~ Virginia 
17~ West Virginia 
18. 1vyoming 
Statutes in which the language "due care" is not mentioned: 
1. Idaho - this statute relieves only for political broad-
casts. 
2. Illinois 
3~ Maine - this statute lays burden of proof upon '.'a person", 
and uses the language "reasonable care" •. 
4. Maryland - this statute relieves only for political broad~ 
casts. 
5. I>Iissouri - this statute relieves only for political broad ... 
casts 
6. Montana - this statute uses the language "proof of actual 
malice". 
7. North Carolina- this statute uses the language "guilty 
of negligence"~ 
8. North Dakota · 
9. South Carolina - this statute relieves only for political 
broadcasts. 
10. Washington 
102. 
:! 
Statutes Placing 
Burden of Proof'.of 
Lack of "Due Care" 
by Station on Com-
plaining Party 
1. Arizona 
2, Florida 
3. Georgia 
4. Kansas 
5. Louisiana. 
6, Michigan 
7. Nebraska 
8. Oregon 
9. South Dakota 
10~ utah 
11. Virginia 
12. West Virginia 
13~ Wyoming 
Statutes Placing Burden of 
Proof of Use of 11 Due Care" 
on Defendant OWner, Lessee,, 
Licensee, Operator, Agent 
or Employee 
1. California 
2. Colorado 
3· Iowa. 
4. ~U.nnesota. 
5. Nevada. 
103~ 
Political Broadcasts 
Statutes Relieving Station 
From Liability When 
Defamation Occurs 
in Course of Broad-
cast by Candidate 
for Public Office 
1. Arizona 
2. Georgia 
3. Idaho 
4. Illinois 
5. Louisiana 
6. Nebraska 
7. Utah 
8. Virginia 
9. West Virginia 
10~ Wyoming 
Statutes Not Specifically 
Relieving Station From Lia~ 
bility When Defamation 
Occurs in Course of Broad-
cast by Candidate for 
Public Office 
1. Florida 
2. Iowa 
3. Kansas 
4. Minnesota 
5. Montana 
6. Oregon 
7. North Carolina 
8~ N0rth Dakota 9. South Dakota 
10~ Washington 
The language of the following statutes is somewhat differ-
ent from that of those above 1n that relief.from liability 
is granted for any defamatory statement made in a broad-
cast by a candidate for public office, "which broadcast 
cannot be censored by reason of the provisions of federal 
statute or regulation of the Federal Communications Com-
mission." 
1. California. 
2. Colorado 
3. Maine 
4. Maryland 
5. Hichigan 
6. rnssouri 
7. Nevada 
8. South Carolina 
104~ 
Statutes Providins 
for Some Damages 
1. Arizona 
2. California 
3. Colorado 
4. Florida 
5. Georgia 
6. Idaho 
7. Illinois 
8. Iowa 
9. Kansas 
10. Louisiana 
11~ !fJ.&ine 
12~ Maryland 
13. Michigan 
14. ltinnesota 
15. Missouri 
16~ Montana 
17. Nebraska 
18. Nevada 
19~ Oregon 
20; North Carolina 
21. North Dakota 
22; South Carolina 
23; South Dakota 
24. Utah 
25. Virginia 
26. Washington 
27; West Virginia 
28. Wyoming 
Damages 
Statutes Providing 
for "Actual Damasesl! 
1. Arizona 
2. Georgia 
3. Illinois 
4. Louisiana 
5. Maryland 
6. Nebraska 
7~ \'lyoming 
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82d Congress 
2d Session 
H. R. 7062 
~Horan Bill 
In the House of Representatives, Ha.rch 13, 1952 
Mr. Horan introduced the following bill; which was referred 
to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce 
A bill to amend section 315 of the Communications Act of 
1934, with respect to the use of broadcasting facilities 
by candidates for public office. 
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives 
of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That 
section 315 of the Communications Act of 1934 (47 u.s.a. 
315) is amended to read as follows: 
Facilities For Candidates For Public Office 
Sec. 315 (a} If any licensee shall permit any legally 
qualified candidate for any public office in a primary, 
general, or other election, or any person authorized in 
writing by such candidate to speak on his behalf, to use 
a broadcasting station, such licensee shall afford equal 
opportunities in the use of such broadcasting station to 
all other such candidates for that office or to persons 
authorized in writing by such other candidates to speak 
on their behalf~ 
(b) The licensee shall have no po'l"ter to censor the 
material broadcast by any person who is permitted to use 
its station in any of the cases enumerated in subsection 
(a) or who uses such station by reason of any requirement 
specified in such subsection; and the licensee shall not 
be liable in any civil or criminal action in any local, 
State, or Federal court because of any material in such a 
broadcast, except in case said licensee shall willfully, 
knowlingly, and with intent to defame participate in such 
broadcast. 
(c) Except to the extent expressly provided in sub-
section (a), nothing in this section shall impose upon any 
licensee any obligation to allow the use of its broadcast-
ing station by any person. 
(d) The Commission shall prescribe appropriate rules 
and regulations to carry out the provisions of this section~ 
Letter to Massachusetts Stations 
Mr. 
General Manager, W---
Street_ 
------ ~mssachusetts 
Dear JJ'.!I'. 
29 April, 1953 
319 Commonwealth Avenue 
Boston 16, Massachusetts 
As part of the requirement for my ~~ster's degree at 
Boston University, I am making a study to determine the 
need of adopting a radio-television libel protective law 
in I-1a.ssachusetts. Such a law would relieve broadcasters 
of liability for defamatory statements made over their 
facilities by persons other than employees, when "due care" 
has been taken by the broadcaster to prevent such state-
ments and to comply with federal laws and with regulations 
by federal agencies. 
As you know, under Section 315 of the Communications 
Act, a broadcaster cannot censor a political speech made 
by a qualified candidate for public office; and under the 
present laws of this Commonwealth you as a broadcaster 
may be liable for a defamatory remark made in such a speech. 
In this survey I am contacting all of the station oper-
ators in Massachusetts. I would like to know whether or 
not you favor such "due care" legislation which would re-
lieve you from the liability created by Section 315 of the 
Communications Act. 
Enclosed is a stamped, 
tate your reply~ Thank you 
tion of this matter. 
addressed envelope to facili-
for your thoughtful considera-
Yours very truly, 
William E. Bagg III 
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~ Table Showing the Response Q! Vassachusetts Radio and 
Television Stations to ~ Letter Asking for ~ Expression 
of Their Opinion M to Whether ~ !!21 They . Favored the 
Adoption of a Radio and Television Dei"amation Statute in 
--the Commonwealth of Massachusetts** --
No No 
Station Response Response Affirmative Negative Commitment 
1. \'TARA X X 
2. '\'ffil·ffi X X' 
3· I'TBZ X X 
4. vlCOP X 
5. WEEI X X 
6. WHDH X X 
7. WLA.w* X X 
8. i'Tl·lEX X X 
g. WNAC X X 
10~ WORL X X 
11. WBET X 
•12. WVOM X 
.13. WTAO X 
14. WALE X 
15. WSAR X 
16~ \;'EUf X 
17. WFGM X X 
18. WKOX X X 
19. \'lHOB X 
20. WHAI X X 
21. WHAV X 
22. WHYN X X 
23. viREB X 
24 • . ~Tee!-! X X 
25~ WCAP X 
26~ WLLH X 
27. WLYN X 
28~ WHIL X X 
:29. WBSU X X 
30. WNBH X 
31. WNNB X 
32. WNAW X 
33· WHUP X 
34. WTGR-FN X 
35. WBEC X X 
'36. 'llBRK X X 
!*A copy of the letter in question may be seen on page 107. 
Now off the air. 
--::-
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No No 
Station Response ResiiOnse A:rfirmative Negative Commitment 
;37~ .WJDA X X 
"38 
" . !39. 
::Lj.o. 
41. 
42. 
:43. 
44. 
:45. 
·46. 
•fi-7. 
:48. 
1!49. 
60. 
51. 52. 
WESX X 
vlACE X X 
WJKO 
'tl!v!AS 
WSPR 
WPEP 
WCRB X X 
\'TARE X 
WTXL X X 
WOCB X X 
WAAB X X 
WNEB X X 
WORC X 
WTAG X X 
WSEE-TV 
.Total 2b 18 3 5 
This list of stations was taken from the 1222 Broadcasting 
Yearbook - Directory of AM and FM Radio Stations of the 
United States, and from the 1222. Telecasting Yearbook -
Television Stations in the United States and Construction 
Permits Granted to February 10, 122.2• 
Television and FM stations operating under the same call-
letters and the same management as their AI-1 aff'iliates, 
were not sent separate letters and are not included in 
the table. 
80% of Massachusetts broadcasters replying to this inquiry 
favored some class of protective legislation concerning 
radio and television defamation. 
The responding letters from the above stations may be seen 
in the following pages, being presented in the same order 
as they are here listed. 
WARA 
I do reel that the FCC regmlation, denying censor-
ship to political talks, does place the radio sta-
tion in jeopardy. 
I believe that "due care" would be very helpr·ul. 
Very truly yours, 
RADIO STATION lfARA 
Keith S. Field, ~·1anager 
• 
110~ 
WBMS 
April 30, 1953 
This is to acknowledge your letter of April 29th 
which I read with great interest. 
You may be sure that I am in favor of "due care" 
legislation which would relieve us from the liabili-
ty created by Section 315 of the Communications 
Act. 
Thank you for your interest~ 
Yours very truly, 
Norman Furman 
Managing Director 
111~ 
WBZ 
May 26, 1953 
Your latter of April 29, 1953 brings up not 
only a very good question, but one that is very 
bothersome to the radio industry. Most radio sta-
tions must be considered as in Inter-State Commerce," 
and therefore, subject to Federal Laws and Regula-
tions. 
Although we have no statutes in our Common-
wealth relieving the station of liability for 
actionable utterances by a candidate, several 
states have, and it is our opinion that this pro-
tection is inadequate. For instance, if Massachu-
setts did have such a law and a candidate broad-
cast material claimed actionable, over our station, 
our signal would go into a number of other states, 
and in these other states we might or might not be 
held liable. 
This brings us to the point where we aak, isn't 
this a matter which can be corrected in only one 
placa,.and that is in our Congress~ 
Sincerely, 
c. s. Young 
WEEI 
May 14, 1953 
We have no strong feelings concerning legislation 
to relieve broadcasters from liability for defama-
tory statements made by persons other than employ-
ees where "due care" has been taken to prevent 
such statements. 
On the one hand, it seems unfair to subject broad-
casters to liability for statements over which they 
have little or no control. 
On the other hand, it is our belief that if broad-
casters were relieved entirely from such liability,. 
there might be a. relaxation of standards of what 
would be acceptable for broadcasting. It is often 
helpful for a broadcaster to be able to point out 
to a speaker that the speaker himself should use 
great care in order that he not subject the broad-
caster to liability for statements of the speaker. 
Very truly yours, 
Harvey J. Struthers 
113~-
WHDH 
May 5, 1953 
In answer to your letter of April 29, personally 
I a.m in f'a.vor of a. "due ca.re" legislation which 
would relieve radio and television stations of 
Massachusetts from the liability created by Section 
315 of the Co~unica.tions Act. 
Cordially, 
William B. McGrath 
Managing Director. 
114. 
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WLAW 
May 8, 1953 
With regards to the question as to our favor-
ing or disapproving "due care" legislation to re-
lieve Massachusetts stations of the liability pre-
sumed to be created by Section 315 of the Communi-
cations Act, let me say only that libel and defama-
tory legislation varies quite a bit in different 
States. Therefore, until we could study the actual 
proposed bill, we could not take a position of 
approving or disapproving. 
Obviously, every broadcaster wants to be pro-
tected from suit for libel or defamation,. but un-
fortunately some legislative acts written to pro-
vide such protection are watered down to a point 
of offering very little alleviation to the broad-
casting station operator~ 
Yours very truly, 
Lambert B. Beeuwkes 
General Manager 
115~ 
ii·--
;--~-~---: -~·- ··-· ·-----·"· 
~-----_-
.. WMEX 
May 2, 1953 
Your communication of the 29th of April addressed 
to Mr. William s. Pote of this station was turned 
over to me for acknowledgement. 
There isn't any question but that the broadcaster 
needs protection from liability that he is in dan-
ger of incurring when his station airs a political 
talk. 
It is quite possible that the recent election ordeal, 
which saw all House members and one third of the 
Senate using radio extensively and the most part 
permitted many of them to "meet up with" TV for the 
first time, may result in some activity on this 
subject before too long~ 
In any event you may be interested to know that 
prior to February 1950 broadcasters were follov1ing 
the section 315 of the Communications Act which 
forbade the censoring of all political talks~ 
In the now celebrated Port Huron case the FCC held 
that a station may not censor a political broadcast 
even if it contained libel. It also indicated 
that the FCC believes the federal law's ban on 
censorship would supersede state lavls against libel~ 
However, in February of 1950 an Attorney by the 
name of David H. H. Felix of Philadelphia brought 
suit against five radio stations in that city charg-
ing in his complaint filed in November of 1949 with 
the Federal District Court there that they all 
aired a speech which was allegedly a false and 
malicious publication by broadcast. The complaint 
alleged that one ~lilliam !.fea.d, Republican city 
chairman, speaking on behalf of local GOP candidates 
during Philadelphia's city election campaign, re-
ferred to the Americans for Democratic Action as a 
116~ 
Communist-infested group. Mr. Felix was a member of 
ADA. 
In a brief filed by station KYW, a Westinghouse 
property, it admitted that the speech was made but 
contended that there was no liability on it under 
Section 315 of the Communications Act of 1934 
which prohibits censorship of a political speech 
and requested the Court for dismissal of the suit~ 
The Court ruled in this case that speeches made by 
persons speaking on behalf of candidates may be 
censored and that the ban on censorship extended 
only to the candidates themselves. 
This of course threw further worries on the broad-
caster and made it seem imperative that some re-
lief be afforded him since so many campaigns depend 
upon prominent citizens, speaking in behalf of 
candidates. 
This libel dilemma has become so important in the 
broadcast industry that many stations hesitate to 
accept any political broadcasts lest they run the 
risk of facing libel suits for candidate's remarks~ 
It is therefore obvious that a measure must be 
adopted that will make broadcasters more ready to 
accept political talks, especially since these talks 
tend, for the most part, to a better informed 
electorate and no matter how viewed, the present situ-
ation places an unfair burden on the broadcasters 
to force them to make their own private decisions 
on parties, candidates and issues, when that burden 
should rightfully be carried by the public. 
It doesn't seem gallant to leave you between the 
libel devil and the law-breaking deep blue sea when 
your Master's degree is at stake but maybe you have 
ideas which will not only solve the problem but earn 
your Degree in so doing. 
Best of luck. 
Yours very truly, 
Lawrence J. Flynn 
Commercial Manager 
117~ 
The Yankee Network 
(IDTAC) 
May 20, 1953 
This is in answer to your recent letter regard-
ing radio-television libel protective lai'rs. 
The problem you raise has been under consider-
ation for a long period of time by broadcasters 
and is a subject of serious study by the NARTB, 
which, as you probably know,. is the tradw associa-
tion to which most broadcasters belong. I think 
that a great deal of the information you might 
need for the study you propose \'rould be readily 
available at NARTB in Washington and suggest that 
you contact them, as they are in possession of a 
broad cross-section type of information which I am 
sure would be of value to you in your study. For 
your convenience, their address is: 
National Association of Radio and Television 
Broadcasters 
1771 N Street, N. W. 
Washington 6, D. C. 
Cordially, 
George w. Steffy 
Vice President 
• 
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WORL 
May 5, 1953 
I am sure that all radio station operators are 
interested in legislation which would protect them 
and their property from libel suits. 
The particular matter you are pursuing for 
your thesis is a broad one and has been the subject 
of much discussion in the radio industry. 
As you might well imagine, any legislation 
that would be drawn on this subject would require 
thorough study on the part of the radio industry, 
so I hesitate to state what my opinion on new legis•• 
lation would be until such time as a thorough study 
of it was made. 
Very truly yours, 
Arthur E. Haley 
General Manager 
WFGM 
May 4, 1953 
The desirability o~ a. radio-television libel pro-
tective law in Massachusetts would seem to me to be 
selr apparent~ As it now stands, broadcasters are 
"damned ir they do and damned if they don't" i~ they 
desire to carry political programs. 
Obviously, where the station cannot censor political 
speeches, yet may be liable ~or de~amatory state-
ments made in these speeches, it is placing the sta-
tions in a. position where they may be held liable 
ror material completely beyond their control~ 
I would personally be heartily in favor of proper 
legislation which would relieve ~~ssachusetts broad-
casters from liability created under Section 315 of 
the Communications Act. 
Yours very truly, 
Ansel E. Gridley 
President and General ~la.nager 
' _- -.-. :t-
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WKOX 
May 18, 1953 
I hope you will pardon the delay in answering your 
letter or April 29 regarding the survey mentioned 
therein~ 
In answering your inquiry, there is little question 
in my mind that the present law under Section 315 
of the Communications Act places an undue burden on 
the broadcaster. Therefore, in my opinion, I would 
most certainly ravor "due care" legislation which 
might seek to bring some relier from reliability 
created by Section 315. 
I trust this is the inrormation you desire and I am 
very pleased to assist you in your work~ 
Very truly yours, 
Richard E. Adams 
Station r.l'a.nager 
121~ 
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WHAI 
Nay 14, 1953 
Any law which makes broadcasting equal to other 
media of public information, both as to protection 
and to responsibility, is in my mind a good law. 
I do not believe that radio should be treated 
differently than the public press in this respect~ 
Sincerely, 
Radio Station WRAI 
John W. Haigis, Jr. 
Manager 
122~ 
-- -- -------
- - ------
WHYN 
April 30, 1953 
In answer to your inquiry of April 29, 1953 
we are represented in matters of the lal'r by our 
N.A.R.T.B. which is a state and national organiza-
tion and are in no position to do anything but 
express our personal opinions. 
We would like to be relieved of any liability 
for defamatory statements made on our facilities 
by persons other than employees. Any change in the 
laws that l'Tould protect us would be welcome~ 
Sincerely, 
Charles N. DeRose 
General Manager 
123~· 
WCCM 
VJB.y 6, 1953 
This will acknowledge receipt or your letter to 
~~. George H. Jaspert, General Manager of this sta-
tion. 
As ~~. Jaspert is presently on an extended tour 
or the country and will not return until the first 
part or June, I will endeavor to answer your question 
as I feel he would want to answer it. 
I believe that he would be most interested in 
such legislation which would relieve this station,. 
and for that matter, all stations, from the liabili-
ty created by Section 315 of the Communications Act. 
I hope that this will give you the ansvTer and 
the information that you were looking for. 
Sincerely yours, 
Daniel B. Ruggles, III 
Commercial lfa.nager 
124~ 
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i'lHIL 
Yay 5, 1953 
I am very much in favor of the legislation that 
you support for radio and television broadcasters in 
your letter of April 29th, 1953. 
Today we are a target under the present day laws 
for lible suits. We as broadcasters operate in the 
public need, convenience and necessity and should be 
given some protection. 
Very truly yours, 
Sherwood J. Tarlow 
President 
125~ 
WBSM 
].!a.y 1' 1953 
As your letter indicates, you are aware of the basic 
aspects of this problem. The most disturbing aspect 
to the broadcaster is the fact that he is on one 
hand limited in his right to censor by the FCC and 
is on the other hand not relieved of legal liability 
for the content of certain political and labor 
addresses. 
In so far as I am concerned as a broadcaster, my 
feeling is that this problem cannot be resolved 
~rith a "shades of grey" type of le3islation; I feel 
that it is necessary that the broadcaster be con-
trolled by understandable legislation which will 
tbDroughly define his rights and limitations. In 
other words, we either have to get off the hook 
or be on it as any other arrangement will create 
additional chaos in the interpretation of the law~ 
From what I am able to garner from other broadcasters, 
the industry would be substantially relieved by 
"black or white" legislation which rulings then can 
be used to illustrate our contentions to the time 
user in the event that questionable material is 
presented for broadcasting. 
I hope that the above comments represent the infor-
mation you desired to receive and if there are any 
other specific questions please feel free to write. 
Very truly yours, 
Otto F. A. Arnold 
General J.f.anager 
··---- ----=-=-=-~-- -----
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WBEC 
:1-!s.y 4, 1953 
This is to acknowledge your letter of April 29, 1953., 
It is my belief that no media should be held re-
sponsible for defamatory remarks on the part of 
political candidate or others unless proof of con-
spiracy can be established. 
In the past, I attempted to read speeches in ad-
vance of broadcast and sometimes it was difficult 
for me to decide whether or not certain parts might 
be defamatory. When such matters take so long in 
courts, there is no reason to expect a small station. 
manager to be able to judge without expert advice · 
and that advice would cost more than the income. 
Furthermore, a station manager might delete any 
part only to have the candidate replace it just be-
fore air time and after it was once said a station 
became just as responsible as before. 
Accordingly, I am in favor of "due care" legisla-
tion which would relieve all media from responsi-
bility. 
With kindest personal regards, I remain 
Very truly yours, 
W. Wendell Budrow 
General Manager 
127. 
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WBRK 
April 30, 1953 
Thank you for your letter of April 29. 
Naturally we are interested in any legislation 
"~>lhich \rill extract us from the embarrassin<>; position 
of being "damned if we do or da=ed if we don't." 
It is still not quite clear in the minds of most 
broadcasters as to whether we are able to turn 
down controversial political broadcasts on the 
suspicion of libel. If we cannot, it naturally 
follows that we don't wish to be held liable in 
the event of defamatory statements. 
I would generally answer your letter in the 
affirmative. In short, any way in which we could 
be relieved from the embarrassment of libel suits 
as a result of politicians who either do not stick 
to the script or make statements which could be 
libelous but are impossible for us to check on 
short notice, would be desirable. 
With kindest personal regards, I am 
Sincerely yours, 
Greylock Broadcasting Company 
John To Parsons 
General Manager 
;: 
WJDA 
April 30, 1953 
Your letter addressed to Hr. Joseph H. Tobin is 
being answered by me, in view of the fact that Mr. 
Tobin is no longer with this organization. 
As to a broadcaster's libel protective law in 
Hassachusetta, it is, as you kno"~>r, a very deep and 
conflicting question. But I believe that we would 
be of little help to you, in view of the fact that 
for wages and hours and other purposes, we are con-
sidered as engaged in Interstate Commerce, and for 
that reason any such state laws would be secondary 
to the federal laws. 
Baaed on these facts, I doubt that we vrould 
have any contribution or suggestion for devising 
a state law. 
Very sincerely yours, 
James D. Asher 
129~ 
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WAGE 
WACE would favor such legislation. 
R. J. Robinson 
WACE I·fanager 
!j 
i!, 
WCRB 
April 30, 1953 
Re your letter of April 29: WCRB does favor the 
"due care" legislation. 
Hope this info helps you in your thesis~ 
Cordially,. 
Charles River Broadcasting Co. 
David B. Tucker, 
Program Director 
·- :l 
WTXL 
:1-'fa.y 5, 1953 
The entire subject of radio and television libel 
responsibility is a perplexing one. l'le have long 
favored an amendment to Section 315 of the Communi-
cations Act, which would relieve the broadcaster 
of entire responsibility for defamatory utterances 
by persons over whom he has no control. An amend-
ment of the Federal Law would, in my opinion, be 
preferable to state legislation. 
The inter-state nature of radio broadcasting 
was established by the Courts many years ago. I 
can see a great deal of confusion arising if the 
legislatures of the various states were to enter 
into the complex field of the Communications Law~ 
I trust that this gives you the information 
sought in your letter of April 29th. 
Very truly, 
Lawrence A. Reilly 
General Manager 
132~. 
WOCB 
May 5, 1953 
Certainly we feel very strongly that broadcast-
ing stations should not be in a position of being 
open to libel and yet legally be unable to do any-
thing to prevent it~ Your study seems certainly to 
have merit. 
We are under the impression that legislation 
is pendin5 before Congress to correct the situa-
tion. We also have the feeling that this correction 
should be a federal matter rather than left to the 
individual states. 
We hope this is the information you desire and 
wish you luck in your study. 
Sincerely, 
Radio Stations WOCBjWOCB-FM 
Paul Stiles 
Manager 
133~ 
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WAAB 
:!!JB.y 8' 1953 
I certainly do favor "due care" legislation which 
would relieve us from liability created under Sec-
tion 315 of the Communications Act~ It seems very 
obvious that if we are required to broadcast a. 
political speech and do not have the right to censor 
it, under law, that we should be relieved of any re-
sponsibility for what is said. 
As it now stands broadcasters are "the goat" and 
some relief should be provided. 
I am interested to see that you have made this sub-ject the basis for your Master's degree and I hope 
it comes to the attention of the Commission~ 
Sincerely, 
'11lson Enterprises, Inc~ 
George F. \'Tilson 
··::--·~-----;; -------~ 
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WNEB 
April 30, 1953 
In answer to your letter of April 29th, Radio 
Station WNEB most certainly is in favor of the "due 
care" legislation which you describe. 
I note that such legislation has been enacted 
in other states and I hope that our own Legislature 
will act favorably~ 
Very truly yours, 
John J. Hurley 
General Manager 
135~ 
" WTAG 
May 26, 1953 
This is in reply to your letter of April 29th to 
Mr~ Robert Booth. I trust you will pardon the delay. 
Mr. Booth and I have both been out of the city for 
some time. 
Naturally, as operators of a radio station, we 
would be in favor of legislation relieving broad-
casters of liability for defamatory statements when 
"due care" has been exercised. 
As a matter of fact, this type of legislation should 
be federal rather than by states, inasmuch as vary-
ing state laws complicate the picture as in the 
case of network broadcasts. It also would be better 
to have federal legislation, inasmuch as we operate, 
as you know, under federal regulations of the FCC. 
The matter really calls for careful study rather 
than a quick yes or no as to favoring a "due care" 
law. Care must be exercised that the radio station 
operators are not put in the position of being too 
free to "censor" material. Whether such a phrase 
as "due care" can ever be pinned do\m is doubtful. 
I trust I have complied with your request without 
confusing the issue too much. 
Very truly yours, 
H. L.I:rueger 
Station Manager 
- ·c ... 1t 
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